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ABSTRACT 
 
BIDISHA LAHIRI: Three essays on the interaction of international trade and 
environmental outcomes and policies 
(Under the direction of Patrick Conway) 
 
 
 
Economic literature on international trade identifies the sources of comparative 
advantage like endowments and technology that drive international trade and result in 
gains from trade. Comparative advantage is however also affected by environmental 
standards. Stricter environmental standards are commonly believed to erode an existing 
comparative advantage of developing countries and hence result in lower gains from 
trade. Based on this popular belief, developing economies might legislate weak 
environmental standards or fail to enforce existing standards in the hope of encouraging 
“dirty” industries. My essays take a more sophisticated look at the trade and environment 
relation and find that the relation between welfare gains from trade and environmental 
quality is not one of simple trade-off of one against the other as popularly believed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic literature on international trade identifies the sources of comparative 
advantage like endowments and technology that drive international trade and result in 
gains from trade. Comparative advantage is also affected by environmental standards. 
Stricter environmental standards are commonly believed to erode an existing comparative 
advantage of developing countries and hence result in lower gains from trade. Based on 
this popular belief, developing economies might legislate weak environmental standards 
or fail to enforce existing standards in the hope of encouraging “dirty” industries to grow 
or locate there.  
My essays take a more sophisticated look at the trade and environment relation 
and find that the relation between welfare gains from trade and environmental quality is 
not a simple trade-off of one against the other as popularly believed.  
In my first essay I find that with growth of an economy, when environmental 
standards become stricter at a higher income, the relation between income and 
environment is likely not monotonic. Instead it follows an inverted U-shape, with 
environmental quality deteriorating at the earlier phase of economic growth and 
improving at a later phase of economic growth. In terms of welfare gains, when the 
environmental standards become stricter to reflect the preferences of the richer residents, 
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the community welfare level is maximized. The economy could implement weaker 
environmental standards and sustain a greater volume of production and trade, but at a 
cost in terms of welfare lost. If environmental standards are reduced below optimum, 
welfare levels are reduced also.  
In this essay, I also find that two economies that have different relative incomes at 
the beginning of international trade have very different time paths of environmental 
quality, trade pattern and welfare levels even when they independently and optimally set 
their environmental policy each period. This indicates that it is not sufficient for countries 
to consider only environmental quality while setting environmental standards; the impact 
that the environmental policy has in influencing the trade pattern and capital flows needs 
to be considered while designing a truly optimal environmental policy.  
This insight is further explored in the second essay where the impact of trade 
policies on environmental quality and the impact of environmental policy on production 
and trade patterns are considered holistically. The second essay abstracts from growth 
issues in order to focus on this more sophisticated interaction of trade and environmental 
policies. I once more derive results that refute the popularly believed trade-off between 
gains from trade and gains from environmental quality. In a repeated game framework, I 
find that when each economy acts non-cooperatively, it sets low environmental standards 
and high tariffs. When the economies cooperate on trade policy, they reduce their tariffs 
but simultaneously they choose to lower their environmental standards. They then end up 
with higher welfare than under non-cooperation. This seemingly supports the trade-
environment trade off. However, when I consider the more interesting scenario of a 
jointly negotiated trade and environment treaty, I find that lower tariffs and stricter 
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environmental standards can be sustained compared to non-cooperation. This is also 
associated with significant gains over the non-cooperative as well as over the trade only 
cooperative situations. This re-emphasizes the fact that better environmental quality is not 
necessarily in conflict with international trade and with gains from international trade. 
My third essay looks at another trade-off between international trade and 
environmental standards known as the Pollution Haven hypothesis. It has been commonly 
believed that stricter environmental standards will result in dirtier industries migrating to 
countries with weaker environmental standards. This has made economies wary of 
tightening their environmental standards due to the fear of losing comparative advantage 
in the high polluting industries. It also has encouraged other economies to maintain low 
environmental standards with the hope of attracting the dirty industries. In my third 
essay, I find that dirtiness of an industry is not a sufficient indicator to predict the impact 
of a stricter environmental regime. It is important to consider the interaction of 
“dirtiness” and input use intensity of an industry to predict the impact of a stricter 
environmental standard. For two equally dirty industries, the one that has an input 
requirement more similar to the abatement technology will be affected more negatively, 
while a dirty industry whose input requirement is very different from the abatement 
technology could experience increased production in the stricter regime. These results 
indicate that the relation between environmental standards and comparative advantage in 
dirty industries does not have the simple inverse relation as believed.  
My research design abstracts from various real world regularities as outlined 
below.  
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My first essay builds a growth model and assumes production functions to be 
decreasing returns. However, in the real world, production functions might exhibit 
increasing returns at the earlier stages of growth and decreasing returns at later stage of 
growth. My model abstracts from this potentially variable-returns-to-scale phenomenon.  
My second model abstracts from growth issues in an infinitely repeated game to 
allow for a more complex analysis of trade and environmental policies.  
My first and second essays assume that the abatement technology has the same 
factor intensity as the industry where the abatement is undertaken. This makes the 
scenario equivalent to the abatement technology using up some of the final commodity. 
This assumption is a simplification made in order to focus on the growth issues in the 
first essay and the strategic issues in the second one. The assumption is relaxed in the 
third essay where difference in input use by the abatement technology and by the 
production sectors drive interesting results. The third essay in turn abstracts from growth 
and strategic issues to keep the analysis tractable. 
A fourth abstraction from real world phenomena centers around the sources of 
environmental degradation. Environmental degradation occurs from two sources. The 
first source is production-driven degradation – when firms pollute air, or put industrial 
by-products in water, or cut down forests to use as inputs in production. The second 
source is consumption-driven environmental degradation where pastures are eroded due 
to excessive use by households for cattle grazing, deforestation occurs due to households 
use of firewood for heating or cooking, air pollution follows from family owned cars, and 
plastic, metal and other consumption related wastes degrade the environment. However 
environmental degradation associated with consumption is tied to the location where the 
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consumption is made and hence international trade does not directly play a role in 
consumption-driven degradation. Hence all my three essays deal with production related 
environmental degradation. 
Additionally, the essays do not consider feedback effects of environmental 
degradation on productivity. Some researchers, (e.g. Pizer) consider scenarios where 
pollutants like green house gases potentially increase the temperature, which negatively 
impacts production. In those models, the welfare cost of environmental degradation arises 
from production loss. In my models the welfare loss arises due to disutility from 
consumption of pollution by affected residents.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, CAPITAL MOBILITY AND THE  
ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE  
IN AN OPEN ECONOMY  
GROWTH MODEL 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION:  
Empirical studies driven primarily by cross-sectional variation find an inverted U 
shaped relation between per capita income and environmental degradation (especially for 
local pollutants) that is called the Environmental Kuznets curve (henceforth EKC). This 
has led to speculation whether growth in income is sufficient to correct for poor 
environmental quality. To infer whether such conclusions are true for a specific economy, 
it is necessary to analyze the income-environment relation over the inter-temporal growth 
path of the economy.  
To investigate the time series properties of a single country’s EKC I construct a 
two country open economy growth model with an environmental externality. Through 
analytical and simulation analysis of this model I draw three conclusions: First, I 
conclude that growth in income is not a sufficient condition for eventual improvement in 
environmental quality. I find that the two conditions necessary for the EKC relation to 
emerge in the growth path of the economies are that the environmental policy of the 
economy should become increasingly strict with growth in per-capita income and also 
that the economy should be sufficiently far from its steady state. Second, in the absence 
  
 7 
of other sources of comparative advantage, the intertemporal income-environment 
relationship for an economy under trade will be better compared to autarky if the trade 
partner is poorer and worse if the trade partner is richer. Third, the transition from 
autarky to international trade will confound the EKC outcome for an individual economy 
while for a cross section of economies this autarky-trade transition will result in an EKC 
relationship even when it is not true for the individual economies.  
In this growth model the choice of environmental policy embodies a tradeoff 
between environmental quality and long-term growth. An EKC will emerge for 
individual economies with anti-pollution policies in place if at lower levels of per-capita 
income emissions due to the strong investment-led production growth overwhelm the 
incentive to producers to reduce emission per unit of production and the incentive to 
move production to cleaner sectors where the pollution tax payment is low. As the 
economy nears it steady state, the same anti-pollution policy regime induces lower 
emission-intensity and cleaner production-composition effects that dominate the 
contributions to emission from economic growth and result in the downward sloping 
segment of the EKC. When the policy regime is such that emissions taxes do not increase 
with per-capita income, these two pressures negating the growth effect are absent and 
hence environmental quality worsens monotonically. Thus whether the EKC emerges for 
an economy or not depends crucially on the environmental policy. When the economy is 
sufficiently close to its steady state, the increasing strictness of environmental policy will 
result only in the downward sloping segment of the EKC because the initial burst of 
economic activity has already been observed. 
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International trade matters because at every point in time, the poorer economy, 
whatever its level of per-capita income, values pollution less than its rich partner and 
hence accepts foreign productive capital that flows wherever returns are higher. Although 
the returns on the foreign capital are remitted abroad, the effects of the pollution remain 
domestically. In this case, it would be misguided for less developed countries, at any 
given income level, to expect environmental quality to be the same as the level the 
developed country had enjoyed at an identical per-capita income. Allowing for the 
standard sources of comparative advantage in the form of different relative endowments 
of the internationally immobile resource shifts the environmental-income relation but it 
does not change the intertemporal properties derived here. 
In my model, the transition from an autarky EKC to an open-economy EKC 
generates a jump in income and environmental quality. In the real world this shift is 
observed over a period of time in the form of the dismantling of export-import tariffs or 
removal of capital flow restrictions. When an economy that was close to its autarky 
steady state enters international trade with a larger partner, it accepts foreign capital and 
experiences a deterioration in environmental quality instead of the improvement 
predicted by the EKC. Similarly, when an economy that was on the rising segment of the 
autarkic EKC starts trading with a much smaller trade partner, it will invest its domestic 
capital abroad and experience both an improvement in environmental quality and 
increasing income. This is a result unlike the prediction from its original EKC. For a 
cross section of countries these movements in trade and capital during the transition will 
generate an EKC even though it might not hold for the individual economies.  
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The majority of the studies on EKC are empirical. They look at environmental 
outcomes explained by per-capita income and other explanatory variables. The few 
existing theoretical studies are limited along one or more of the following dimensions: 
they are static in nature, they do not explicitly model the environmental policy, they 
consider a single production commodity or they consider closed economies. These 
prevent the models from capturing one or more of the growth, intensity, composition or 
trade effects. My model fills this void by allowing these effects to interact in determining 
the final outcome.  
These dimensions of the exercise provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the economic reasons underlying the Environmental Kuznets Curve. I examine whether 
and when it is realistic for polluted economies to pin their hope on higher incomes as a 
engine of improved environmental quality. Lastly, comparison of the predictions of the 
model with information from U.S. emissions data sheds light on actual changes in 
environmental patterns.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a brief 
literature review; section 3 presents a theoretical framework of the model. The broad 
features of the theoretical model are presented in section 3a.  The specific equations of 
transition are presented and explained in section 3b. Section 3c compares the implications 
of the model in the context of private agents versus a social planner’s problem, which is 
especially important when taxes are not set in a welfare maximizing manner. Numerical 
simulation results will be illustrated in section 4. Interpretation of empirical observations 
in the light of the model will be presented in section 5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in 
section 6. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW: 
An empirical study by Grossman and Krueger (1991) uncovered the inverted U 
shaped relation between income and local air and water pollutants. This study spawned 
multiple empirical studies to measure and analyze the EKC. This body of cross-sectional 
and panel empirical studies motivates my research to examine the relation between 
income and environmental quality for a specific economy and the forces that underlie the 
observed relation. 
Theoretical papers by Andreoni and Levinson (1998), John and Pecchenino 
(1994), Jones and Manuelli (1995), Selden and Song (1995) and Stokey (1998) have 
derived patterns for the transition path of pollution for a growing economy. They differ in 
the forms of the welfare function, the production functions, abatement functions and 
intergenerational considerations. However, none of them model the impact of 
international trade and of different environmental policy regimes as important influences 
on the change in pollution in the context of economic growth.  
Smulders, Bretschger and Egli (2005) construct a dynamic simulation EKC 
model. In a closed economy scenario, they distinguish subsequent phases when better 
technologies become available exogenously. Also, the environmental tax structure 
changes exogenously in the different phases. These two characteristics affect the profit 
maximization decision of firms in adopting the new technology or continuing with the 
old. In my dynamic model, I examine both exogenous and endogenous changes in tax 
policy. Also, the technique of production is determined within the model. The interaction 
between the two trading partners, usually absent in the EKC literature, is an important 
addition in my analysis. 
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Starting with two countries that differ in capital and labor endowment, Copeland 
and Taylor (1997) outline a static framework to examine the implication of trade on each 
country’s production pattern and environmental outcomes. They allow capital to be 
mobile, so that a country could employ its domestically owned capital abroad. I start from 
this framework and extend it to a dynamic model so that it is suitable for analyzing the 
intertemporal relation between income and environmental for an economy. The 
differences in initial relative endowments play a weaker role in my model because in a 
dynamic context the endogenously determined intertemporal savings rate is the primary 
determinant of the capital owned by the country. The endogenously determined pollution 
tax in each country has both dynamic and static implications in my model. The pollution 
tax path determines the amount of capital that is accumulated over time, while every 
period it affects the location where the capital is employed and the intensity of emission. 
The interaction of the intertemporal and static effects of the tax determines the final 
emission outcome in my model. 
The classic Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) Neoclassical Growth Model with an 
endogenous savings rate provides the dynamic structure for my model. I simplify the 
instantaneous utility function to be the log function instead of constant-elasticity-of-
substitution in the original RCK framework. However the consumption bundle comprises 
of two goods instead of the single commodity in the RCK model, while the disutility 
from pollution is added in the welfare function. While the original RCK model was for a 
closed economy, my model applies it to two country trading framework. 
In recent research Roe (2005) has used the RCK framework to conduct a 
simulation exercise in an open economy framework in a non environmental context. He 
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however simplifies the openness of the model by assuming a small open economy trading 
with the rest of the world at steady state implying constant prices. Also there is no 
international capital mobility. 
  
3A. THEORETICAL MODEL:  
I start with a dynamic general equilibrium model with two types of goods (Xt and 
Yt) and two inputs (Lt and Kt) observed at each time period t. For every economy there 
are three sets of economic agents: consumers who maximize lifetime welfare, social 
planner who sets environmental policy either optimally to maximize the social welfare or 
sub-optimally without reference to social welfare, and producers who take the 
environmental taxes as given while maximizing profits. 
 The consumption bundle is of the Cobb-Douglas form )1()()( ωω −= YtXtt CCC . 
Expenditure on consumption is ttYtXtXtt CPCCPE =+=  where Pt is the price index of 
the consumption bundle. 
The every-period utility function is additive in consumption and pollution. It is concave is 
consumption tC  and linear in pollution tZ  where γ  is the constant marginal disutility 
from pollution. The inter-temporal social welfare function is 
Ut= ∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
−=
00
].)[ln(
t
tt
t
t
t
t ZCu γρρ           
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint  
tttXtttttttt BrXPYBBKKCP ++=−+−+ −+ )()( 11  
In this welfare expression the disutility parameter associated with pollution is 
constant, but the marginal valuation of disutility nevertheless increases as economies get 
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richer1. This can be seen from the ratio of the marginal utilities. If tZP ,  is the marginal 
valuation of pollution, and tP  is the marginal valuation of consumption, then 
tt
tt
t
tZ
Cu
Zu
P
P
∂∂
∂∂−
=
/
/
,
, or tttZ CPP γ=,        
Production of each commodity uses one specific physical input, and emits 
pollution Z as byproduct. Y uses K and X uses L as specific factors2. K can be created 
and accumulated and is internationally mobile. L is internationally immobile and also 
cannot be accumulated (example: land).  
In the absence of any abatement activity  sytt KY )(= , tYt KZ =  
sx
tt LX )(= , tXt LZ =  
As in the standard growth models, the production functions are decreasing returns 
in the specific factor. sX is degree of returns in X industry, sY is degree of returns in Y 
industry. The production function can also be interpreted as constant returns where a 
sectorally immobile third input (labor or entrepreneurship) has not been explicitly 
modeled.  
Pollution emission can be abated if some resources are diverted for this purpose. 
Following the approach popularized by Copeland and Taylor3 the production of output 
and production of the emission byproduct are combined into a single function using the 
                                                 
1
 As the valuation of pollution disutility becomes larger as PtCt increases even with a constant γ, no further 
insight is gained by making γ itself a function of PtCt. 
 
2
 The specific factors assumption is used for analytical simplicity. Similar results emerge when both inputs 
are used allowed to be mobile across both sectors. Please refer to appendix 1D. 
 
3
 Copeland and Taylor (1997), “A Simple Model of Trade, Capital Mobility and the Environment,” NBER 
Working Paper 5898 
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abatement technology. If θYt is the fraction of resources spent for abatement activity in 
sector Yt, then output level with abatement activity is  
sy
Yttt KY )}1({ θ−=         (1) 
Emission level after abatement activity is  
tYtYt KZ
αθ /1)1( −=         (2) 
where α is the parameter from abatement technology in the Y sector. Similarly β 
is the parameter from abatement technology in the X sector. 
Combining (1) and (2) by eliminating θYt between the above two production 
functions results in the Cobb Douglas form of production relation4.  
αα −
=
sy
tYtt KZY         (3) 
Similarly  ββ −= sxtXtt LZX         (4) 
Yt emits more pollution per unit of production relative to Xt. This happens 
because α > β implies that it is easier to abate emission in the Xt sector compared to Yt. 
Emissions appears like an input for production; higher emission is associated with a 
higher production level because fewer resources are diverted for abatement of the 
pollution. Y is treated as the numeraire good5. 
As there is no uncertainty, the social cost of disutility from pollution for next 
period is taken into account when making input decisions for the next period. If τt is the 
                                                 
4
 Please refer to appendix 1A. 
 
5
 According to the above interpretation production technology is fixed and the input mix changes with 
changing price of the inputs. Nancy Stokey, “Are there limits to growth” International Economic Review 
1998, Vol 39, Issue 1, Page 1-31, provides an alternate explanation for the production process where 
technology can be interpreted to be changing. All the information for the spectrum of cleanest to dirtiest 
technology is available. Z e [0,1] is the index of the technology actually adopted in an economy depending 
on the prevailing incentives. Higher values of Z indicates that a dirtier technology is adopted which yields 
more goods but also more pollution.. 
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shadow price of disutility from pollution, then maximization of social welfare requires 
that the marginal cost tτ  imposed on emissions should equal the value of social benefit or 
value of marginal product from allowing the last unit of emission.  
t
tXt
t Z
XP.β
τ =          (5) 
Using this condition to substitute for Zt in the production function makes Xt production a 
function of Lt  and relative prices. 
β
β
β
β
τ
β
−
−
−
=
11 )().(
sx
t
t
Xt
t L
P
X   i.e. ),,;,( ttXttt sxLPXX τβ=    (6) 
Similarly α
α
α
α
τ
α
−
−
−
=
11 )()(
sy
t
t
t KY  i.e. ),,;( tttt syKYY τα=    (7) 
Given the prevailing market incentives, there is efficient allocation of resources in 
every period both for consumption and production. However, investment motives cause 
the sequence of static equilibria to evolve and move towards the steady state, where there 
is no further desire for change. Comparison of the evolution towards the relevant steady 
states provides interesting insights about the environmental-quality outcomes.  
 
3B. EQUATIONS OF TRANSITION: 
Under free trade, both goods Xt and Yt are traded. Capital Kt accumulates over 
time without any depreciation and is internationally mobile. In every period capital 
moves to where the payments are higher, until the payments in both economies are 
equalized. The second input land/labor Lt is assumed to be fixed and internationally 
immobile. The two economies are assumed to have an identical endowment of this fixed 
input. An international financial market for bonds Bt also exists and an interest rt is 
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earned on each bond held. To focus on environmental issues, we assume that the 
exchange rate equals unity and  that purchasing power parity is satisfied. 
For the two economies interacting with each other, the equations are similar in 
form. I denote the foreign variables with *. The model has 23 variables {Ct, Kt, Bt, Pt, rt, 
Ct*, Kt*, CXt, CYt, CYt*, CXt*,Yt, Xt, Yt*, Xt*, ZYt, ZXt, ZYt, Zt, ZYt*, ZXt*, Zt*, PXt}under 
free trade when the two economies are considered. So the strategy in solving this model 
is to identify a smaller subset of variables which are solved from the dynamic equations. 
Once the time path of these key variables is known, the rest of the system is solved using 
the static equations of the model. 
With free trade, the core subset of dynamic relations is the seven difference 
equations below. 
tttXtttttttt BrXPYBBKKCP ++=−+−+ −+ )()( 11     (8) 
tttXtttttttt BrXPYBBKKCP −+=−−−+ −+
**
1
**
1
* )()(    (9) 
)]()}(1{1[1 1' 11' 1
11
++++
++
−+= tttt
tttt
KZKY
CPCP
γρ
    (10)
 
}]1{1[1 1
11
+
++
+= t
tttt
r
CPCP
ρ
       (11) 
)](*')}(*'1{1[1 * 1* 1*
11
* ++
++
−+= tt
tttt
KZKY
CPCP
γρ
    (12)
 
}]1{1[1 1*
11
* +
++
+= t
tttt
r
CPCP
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       (13)
 
Xt
tttt
tttttt P
CwPCwP
LPXLPX
*
** ),(),( +=+      (14) 
Yt(Kt)+Yt*((Kt*)= (1-w)Pt(Ct+Ct*)+(Kt+1-Kt)+(Kt+1*-Kt*)    (15) 
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Equations (8) and (9) are the budget equations of the two economies. While 
interpreting these equations it is important to distinguish between the stock of capital that 
is employed in an economy and the amount of capital that is actually owned by the 
economy. This discrepancy occurs because the residents of an economy may own capital 
which they decide to employ in a foreign country, and enjoy the returns earned on the 
capital in the foreign economy. The tK  and *tK  in equations (8) and (9) denote the 
amount of capital employed in the two countries respectively. The tB  represents flow of 
domestic wealth to foreign nations for purpose of consumption smoothing and 
investments in production both of which earn returns at the rate rt6. The profits from 
employing capital stay with the country where it is employed, while the owners receive 
only the rental returns. 
Equation (10) and (11) are the first order conditions of welfare maximization with 
respect to 1+tK  and tB  respectively, alternately known as Euler equations. Equations (12) 
and (13) are the corresponding equations for the foreign economy. These four equations 
together imply that the investments in capital located domestically, capital located abroad 
and in bond-holding earn equal marginal return every period. 
Equations (14) and (15) are the market clearing conditions for X and Y in the 
world market. For the X commodity, consumption demand is the only source of demand. 
Since the Y commodity is used both for consumption and as capital, the demand has 
consumption demand and investment demand components. 
                                                 
6
 Refer to Appendix C for details 
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Since the individual budget conditions are being considered, one of the market 
clearing conditions given by equation (14) or (15) is redundant by Walras Law. So 
equations (8) – (15) represent 7 equations in the 7 variables Ct, Kt, Bt, Pt, rt, Ct*, Kt*.  
Once the time paths of these 7 variables are known, the remaining 16 variables of the 
system can be determined using the static equations7. 
At the start of trade, I assume that capital is reallocated across economies so that 
the marginal return to every unit of capital employed in any country is the same. This 
represents the familiar jump of variables as countries relocate on the new saddle path on 
their journey to the new steady state. There is no cost to capital reallocation in this model. 
Hence the jump of a large amount of capital to the country with weaker environmental 
standards is an expected result and serves as a check for the model. 
The system of dynamic equations does not assume intrinsic asymmetries of the 
two economies. For two otherwise identical economies, this approach makes transparent 
the importance of difference in relative incomes and different environmental policy 
regimes in determining the outcome. Asymmetric modeling moves the outcome in 
expected directions and does not uncover unexpected results. For example, if the 
disutility parameter is different for the two economies, the one with the smaller parameter 
would accept more capital, have weaker environmental standards and sustain a higher 
income for the integrated economy. If the production technology is different for the two 
economies, then more capital flows to the economy where capital is more productive. For 
these reasons, I have abstracted from intrinsic asymmetries of the two economies in my 
core model to focus on the relative income and environmental policy effects on the 
                                                 
7
 Note that the price index Pt for the consumption bundle Ct is an unique transformation of PXt: 
])1(/[)( )1( ωωω ωω −−= Xtt PP  
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pattern of international trade8. The contribution of this paper to the asymmetric modeling 
literature is important because instead of the obvious asymmetries it highlights that 
asymmetries like difference in initial relative income, or environmental policy regimes, 
still have an important role in determining the outcome. 
The first-order conditions for optimization are solved for the steady state. The 
steady state is defined as a situation where all variables maintain a constant level. Then 
the first order conditions, which are first order difference equations, are linearized around 
the steady state to get an idea about the evolution of the variables. The steady state in this 
model exhibits saddle path stability and the stable eigenvalues define the movement of 
the variables along the saddle path over time9. 
To find the necessary conditions for an EKC, I analyze the evolution of 
emissions. 
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8
 I present comparative dynamics with two asymmetric modeling cases: one where the two economies have 
different endowments of the fixed input, and the second where the two economies have different disutility 
parameters, on pages 31 and 136 respectively.  
 
9
 Refer to Appendix B for technical details 
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Equation (16) tells us that growth in pollution is an increasing function of the 
growth in K, the increase in prices, and the share of the dirty industry. It is a decreasing 
function of growth in taxation. The necessary conditions for the EKC to emerge are that 
initially the positive effects of capital accumulation on emissions should dominate and 
later the negative impact of stricter policy in emissions should dominate. The first 
condition is satisfied when an economy is distant from its steady state and has a strong 
investment demand. The second necessary condition is satisfied when environmental 
policy becomes proportionally stricter with income. 
In the early stages of growth, there is strong impetus for growth in output to 
satisfy the consumption demand and the desire to build up capital stock. Hence the 
positive scale component dominates. Although emissions taxes are also on the rise, the 
effect is not strong enough to negate the scale effects of growth. As the economy 
approaches its steady state, the growth rate declines and the effect of growing taxes 
becomes relatively more important. On one hand, it reduces the profit-maximizing 
emissions per unit, and on the other hand, it provides an incentive for producers to shift to 
the less dirty industry. These result in the declining segment of the EKC.  
 
3C. DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL EMISSIONS TAXES THROUGH COMPARISON 
OF SOCIAL PLANNER’S PROBLEM AND ECONOMY WITH PRIVATE AGENTS: 
Having looked at the social planner’s problem until this point, it becomes 
important to examine whether such an outcome can be sustained with decision-making by 
private agents. The consumers make consumption and savings decision every period, 
taking the interest rate, which is the returns to capital, as given. In his optimization 
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decision each individual consumer also takes the aggregate emissions level Zt as 
exogenous, which cannot be affected by his individual savings decision. 
Ut ∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
−≡≡
00
].)[ln(
t
tt
t
t
t
t ZCu γρρ      
subject to PtCt+bt= (1+rt)bt-1+ Lumpsum income from aggregate emission tax collected 
The above maximization with respect to consumption expenditure shows that 
equations (11) and (13) are relevant consumer choice equations. 
The profit maximizing producers choose the amount of capital to be employed 
every period, taking the environmental taxes as exogenous. The emissions tax serves the 
purpose of making the producers abate as long as their abatement cost is less than the per 
unit tax. The amount of tax collected tZ.τ on the emission actually produced is distributed 
in lump sum to the consumers. From the profit-maximizing behavior ttt YZ ατ =. , the 
increase in pollution due to increase in capital employed is calculated as 
)(')()(' t
t
t KYKZ τ
α
= . An additional unit of capital employed increases the amount of Yt 
produced. However, the additional unit of capital also increases the profit maximizing 
amount of pollution emitted, which is levied a tax at the rate τt
 tttttt rKZKYK −−=∂Π∂ )(')('/ τ       
Profit maximization implies tttt rKYK =−⇒=∂Π∂ )(')1(0/ α    (17) 
Equation (17) thus emerges from profit maximizing conditions irrespective of the 
pollution-tax scenario.  
The corresponding equation for the foreign economy is tt rKY =− *)(*')1( α  (18) 
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Equations (17) and (18) are the relations of transition that link the emissions taxes 
to the level of capital with private agents, replacing equations (10) and (12) under the 
social planner’s optimization. Elimination of current consumption expenditure between 
equations (10) and (11) of the social planner’s problem results in the relation 
)1)(('
t
tttt CPKYr τ
αγ−=          (10’)  
Equation (10’) is typical of the standard Ramsey-Caas-Koopman type of dynamic 
model where zero cost of adjustment of capital and absence of uncertainty ensures that 
the marginal return to capital equals the interest rate every period. The optimal time path 
of capital stock satisfies this in each period. The optimal pollution tax is defined as one 
that ensures that equation (10’) of the social optimum conditions is identical with the 
profit-maximizing relation (17). This turns out to be ttt CPγτ = . Hence these optimal 
taxes can sustain the social planner’s outcome even when private agents make the 
decisions.  
When taxes are low, i.e. ttt CPγτ < , then the social optimal payment to capital as 
captured by equation (10’) should be lower than what is paid by profit-maximizing 
producers as reflected in equation (17). This is because with low emission taxes, every 
unit of capital is associated with a higher emission, causing a higher disutility, the 
valuation of which should be reduced from the payment to capital to provide it with the 
correct incentives. When the payment to capital is not corrected by the taxation, the 
private economy will follow an evolution path that is different from the socially optimal 
path. 
  
 23 
In the static case, the tax on capital was not important because once the pollution 
had occurred, that was the end of the story. In the dynamic model, payment to capital is 
an important consideration because it determines the incentive for building future capital 
stock in each economy and hence future pollution and consumption. 
A fixed pollution tax in an economy may arise due to the governing institution’s 
lack of capability in evaluating pollution disutility every period or else to a desire to 
provide an incentive to produce for some reason other than maximizing social welfare. It 
may be unrealistic to expect that this governing body will be able or willing to set a 
complicated and instantaneously changing capital tax in order to partially offset the effect 
of its inefficient pollution taxes. This makes it important to compare the evolution of an 
economy where emission taxes are efficient against one where the emission taxes are 
suboptimal and corresponding capital taxes are absent.  
So the system of equations for the private economy with pollution tax and no 
subsequent tax on capital comprises of equation (17) and (18) replacing equations (10) 
and (12). These sets of equations are identical only when emissions taxes are set 
optimally. 
Every period the government imposes a tax {τt} per unit of emission. Three 
different policy regimes are considered. First, as in the static model, the pollution tax is 
assumed to be set efficiently as the shadow price of pollution every period in both 
economies tttZt CPP γτ == , . This is more realistic for developed economies where 
wealthier residents, who are more aware of the cost of environmental degradation, can 
expect the policy making agency to reflect their concerns through stricter regulations. 
However for economies with fewer resources, the cost of monitoring as well as the 
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administrative costs of changing the standards may make periodic synchronization of 
pollution tax with consumer demands infeasible. Hence the second pollution tax 
framework is such that the emission tax remains fixed for the period under consideration, 
zero environmental taxes being a special case of this fixed-tax ττ =t . This may be a 
more realistic institutional setup if one identifies the efficient-tax economy as the 
developed countries and the fixed-tax economy as the less developed countries. A third 
possibility considered is one where the emissions tax rises either too strongly or too 
weakly with growth and not according to the marginal valuation of  pollution disutility. 
Refer to diagram 1.1 for illustration of these optimal and suboptimal environmental tax 
setting scenarios. 
 
Diagram 1.1: Optimal and sub-optimal emission taxes for any given period 
 
3D. LESS TARGETED ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES: 
For many developing countries, pollution taxation as modeled above is not an 
option. Hence it would be useful to introduce a less targeted production taxation of the 
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dirty industry.  As the tax is not on emissions, the relation (5) is not valid in this scenario. 
Hence the production function and the abatement function cannot be combined as before 
to express production as a function of environmental taxes as was done in expressions (6) 
and (7) by eliminating emissions.  
Production of output: Yt=Ktsy 
Production of emissions: Zt= Kt 
The government imposes a tax τt on per unit of Kt because in the absence of tax 
specifically on emissions, once the capital stock is selected there will not be any further 
incentive to reduce emissions during use of that capital. This would result in emissions 
Zt= Kt, causing disutility to consumers. In this scenario, equation (10) derived from 
intertemporal maximization takes the specific form below: 
]}).(1{1[1 11
11
γρ −+= −+
++
sy
t
tttt
Ksy
CPCP
      (19)
 
Other than equation (19), the rest of the system of equations remains unaffected. 
Combining equation (19) with (11) provides below an alternative expression under social 
optimum. tt
sy
tyt CPKsr γ−= −1)(        (20) 
Profit maximizing producers have to pay the tax tτ  for every unit of capital 
employed. Hence the profit maximizing payment to capital is t
sy
tyt Ksr τ−=
−1)(   (21) 
The optimal emission tax can be derived as before as one that help achieve 
equation (20) for an economy with private agents. Comparison of (20) and (21) determine 
the optimal tax structure to be ttt CPγτ =       (22) 
Hence the optimal tax structure has the same functional form whether it is a 
targeted emissions tax or a less targeted one imposed on the dirty input capital.  
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4. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS: 
Starting with a set of benchmark parameters, I vary the parameters to see the 
implications of the results and the relevance with real world scenarios. 
Parameter Explanation 
ω=0.25 Weight of the X commodity in the consumption bundle 
sx=0.9 Degree of returns to scale for X production 
sy=0.9 Degree of returns to scale for Y production 
β=0.5 Pollution emission coefficient for X production 
α=0.7 Pollution emission coefficient for Y production 
γ = 0.04 Awareness parameter in home 
γ* = 0.04 Awareness parameter in foreign economy 
ρ = 0.99 Discount rate 
s=1 Ratio of income of foreign economy and home economy 
Table 1.1: Benchmark parameter values and interpretations 
The X commodity can be thought of as an agricultural commodity whose weight 
in the consumption bundle is small (ω=0.25). The decreasing-return parameters are 
meaningful if the Y industry is intensive in capital, the X industry is intensive in land. 
The discount rate “ρ” is chosen to be the commonly used value of 0.99 while the relative 
size of the economies “s” is varied in the numerical simulations. The pollution disutility 
parameters are small relative to the unit weight on consumption utility, the specific value 
chosen is for convenience.  
 
4A. BENCHMARK SITUATION: 
The two economies are of equal size (s=1) and have the same pollution disutility. 
Both set emission taxes in the socially optimal manner and start trade at an early level of 
economic development. (Please refer to Diagram 1.2 at end of this essay) 
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 This is a scenario where both necessary conditions for the EKC are satisfied, and 
the complications of international trade have also been simplified. In this scenario with 
two identical economies, the local pollutant and income do show the traditional inverted 
U shaped relation. The volume of international flow of goods and capital is zero as the 
economies are identical.  
These forces will be clearer if we look at the time series of emissions instead of at 
the income-pollution relationship (Refer to diagram 1.3). Couched in terms of the 
familiar scale, composition and technique effects10, the same mathematical outcome can 
be seen diagrammatically.  Compared to an initial period, the effects of use of cleaner 
techniques as well as a shift towards a cleaner product mix partially counteract the effects 
of degradation due to increased scale of production. With efficient taxes the growth of 
scale is restrained and even is reduced as residents value the environment more strongly 
when rich. This does not necessarily mean that the consumption level goes down. As the 
economy approaches its steady state, the eagerness to accumulate capital declines and 
investment demand falls.  Consumption grows but at an increasingly slower rate, out of 
production using existing capital stock. The cleaner impact of lower emission intensity 
and cleaner product mix induced by stricter emission taxes dominate the growth-of-
production effect as the economy approaches the steady state along the downward arm of 
EKC. 
 
4B. INTERTEMPORALLY FIXED EMISSIONS TAXES: 
With fixed emission taxes, the policy condition necessary for the EKC is violated. 
When taxes do not increase over time, no incentive is provided to use a cleaner 
                                                 
10
 Grossman and Krueger, 1991 
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technology or to shift to the cleaner sector as income increases. Looking at equation (16), 
we see that both negative pressures drop off. The time path of emissions should exhibit a 
pattern of monotonic increase as shown in the diagram. While it is possible to attain the 
long term pollution by setting the fixed tax at the long term optimum, this imposes 
unnecessary burden in the early stages of development when the economy does not value 
the disutility of pollution very strongly. (Refer to Diagram 1.4) 
I look again at the decomposition into scale, composition and intensity effects 
(Refer to Diagram 1.5). The scale of production grows unabated as there is no stronger 
restraining force in the later periods. As the inputs used in the dirty industry grow and 
taxes remain unchanged, this encourages production in the dirty sector. As the prices of 
the commodities go up, this reduces the real value of the fixed taxes. So the profit 
maximizing producers are encouraged to use increasingly dirty techniques. All three 
effects contribute positively to environmental degradation, making the overall sum of 
these effects even larger.  
The income-pollution relation is found to be monotonic and unlike the EKC 
shape. However rich the economy becomes, or however important its position is with 
respect to the world economy, pollution will not decline with rising income if the 
governing body does not implement pollution taxes to reflect the growing disutility 
valuation of the residents. With fixed emissions taxes, the steady state capital is defined 
uniquely where the marginal payment to capital equals the rate of time preference. Hence 
we see in the diagram 1.6 that the steady state emission is set uniquely irrespective of the 
income level that the economy attains.  
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4C. EMISSIONS TAXES THAT INCREASE WITH GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY, 
BUT NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
The efficient emissions policy derived in the theoretical model is where the rising 
environmental taxes exactly reflect the increasing valuation of pollution disutility. This 
efficient tax is a special case that satisfies the necessary policy condition for EKC- that 
environmental taxes should rise with increasing income. If taxes are lower that the 
optimum, the height of the inverted U is much higher (Refer to diagram 1.7). This 
additional pollution contribution arises because of all three scale, intensity and 
composition effects. Producers are interested in holding a larger capital stock as the tax 
payments are low, which increases the scale of production. As taxes are below the 
socially optimum, the intensity of emission is high. Low taxes also reduce the pressure to 
move to a cleaner composition of production. However, this is not the socially best 
outcome. Hence, an inverted U shaped income-environment relation from the time series 
data of an economy is not enough to infer that the economy is on the socially optimal 
trajectory. There exists scope for improvement in environmental policy to improve the 
outcome. 
 On the other extreme, we can imagine an environmental regime that wishes to 
avoid the hump altogether and sets stronger environmental taxes. This can achieve the 
environmental quality to be monotonically improving with rising income but by 
sacrificing growth. The implications of growth, environmental outcome, home and 
foreign welfare corresponding to different types of policy regimes are tabulated below. 
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Emission Policy K|Steady C|Steady Z|Steady Income-emission 
relation during 
transition 
W|Steady 
ttt CPγτ =  5115.6 345 249.96 Monotonically rising -3.39 
ttt CPγτ =  
Socially optimum policy 
in this model 
397 16.23 26.76 EKC 2.63 
5.2)( ttt CPγτ =  113.56 4 5.34 Monotonically 
declining 
1.26 
Table 1.2: Growth-environment tradeoff for different policy regimes with benchmark 
parameter values 
 
As the first row of the above table shows, environmental policies that increase 
with per capita income may be weak enough never to overwhelm the growth in capital, 
resulting in a monotonically rising income-emissions relation. This allows higher returns 
to capital and hence growth to a higher steady state consumption (345) and capital stock 
(5115.6). The environment policy regime might be strict to result in a continuously 
improving environmental quality as income increases. Though this might appear 
desirable, one has to realize that the environmental quality (5.34) is achieved at the cost 
of a lower growth and a lower achievable consumption (4.0). Hence, the environmental 
policy that the social planner chooses reflects a trade off between consumption and 
environment. The EKC shape arises in only a range of environmental policies where the 
growth in scale initially dominates and then is gradually dominated by the cleaner 
composition and lower intensity effects stimulated by stricter environmental policy. 
 
4D. ABSOLUTE SIZE OF THE ECONOMIES AT THE START OF TRADE:  
When the economies under consideration are already close to their steady state 
(refer to Diagram 1.8), the second necessary condition for the EKC is violated. The 
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growth of pollution is a positive function of capital. If the trading countries at the 
beginning of trade already have sufficient capital between them, the rate of further capital 
accumulation will be slow.  The pollution reducing effect of rising taxes dominates, 
resulting in the downward segment of the EKC. Whether one will see the inverted shape 
under trade depends solely on whether the countries have passed the hump during their 
autarkic growth.  
 
4E. SOURCES OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CAUSED BY DIFFERENCE IN 
ENDOWMENTS:  
I consider other sources of comparative advantage by allowing the two economies 
to have different endowments of land ( L ). For two economies with the same income 
levels at the beginning of trade, this means that the economy with a larger L  has a 
smaller endowment of capital. The steady state versions of equations (10)-(13) form a 
self contained system defining the capital stock employed in each economy and the value 
of consumption in each economy. Thus a different endowment of the immobile 
endowment does not influence either the value of consumption or the level of capital 
employed in each economy. This also implies that the steady state environmental taxes 
are the same as before in both economies. To get an insight about the effect of difference 
in endowment, I assume that the total world endowment of L + *L  is as before, but the 
allocation is different across the two economies (refer to diagram 1.9). The economy with 
the larger endowment of L  will produce a greater world share of Xt and will experience a 
worse environmental outcome for the same income levels. 
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Having considered the impact of environmental policy on the observed income-
environment relation, I consider how international trade affects the income-environment 
relation for any given environmental policy regime.  
 
4F. TWO TRADING ECONOMIES IDENTICAL IN ALL RESPECTS, BUT 
STARTING TRADE AT DIFFERENT INCOME LEVELS: 
If the foreign economy is at an earlier point of its growth path than the home 
economy at the beginning of trade, its marginal valuation of disutility is lower than at 
home at every point in time. Hence the foreign economy accepts home capital allowing 
the home economy to enjoy better environmental conditions (refer to diagram 1.10). As 
the gains from investment are shared across the economies due to mobile capital, home 
still enjoys income from its assets employed abroad. Assuming emission taxes to be 
efficiently set resulting in the intertemporal EKC relation, international trade shifts the 
EKC down for the richer partner than what would have been possible under autarkic 
growth. The consumption growth is locked in the same ratio as can be seen by comparing 
equations (8) and (10). So the developing foreign economy exports goods to the home, 
while the home economy finances its commodity consumption through capital flows to 
the foreign economy. At the steady state, the rich home will be willing to grow more than 
what it would willing when trading with an equal partner. This additional growth is 
desirable as it is financed out of overseas investment at no pollution cost to self.  
The poorer trading partner though values pollution less on account of being 
poorer. However it ends up at a lower steady state income because it cannot appropriate 
the entire gains from the capital employed domestically. (Refer to diagram 1.11.) 
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Moreover, the additional dirtiness that will be associated for it to produce a percentage 
increase in world income makes it not worthwhile. 
To appreciate fully the causes underlying the change in the levels of 
environmental outcome, it will be interesting to once again look at the factors underlying 
the shift. For any given level of income, the efficient taxes are unique. Hence the profit 
maximizing emission intensity will be the same with and without trade for every level of 
income. Diagram 1.12 shows that trade with a poor South reduces the scale of production 
in North. A large volume of the North-owned capital is located in the South. The North 
produces less at home, but can buy the dirty commodity from South using the payments 
on Northern capital employed in South. Hence North can finance the same consumption 
bundle at a lower pollution cost to self which is the effect of reduction in scale of 
production. Additionally, Northern producers now also have a stronger incentive to 
concentrate on the production of the cleaner commodity using the domestically located 
labor.  
For the South, the converse is true. While the scale of production goes up, a part 
of the value of production is remitted to the capital owners of the North. The South ends 
up producing more and selling to North. The composition of production is also more 
biased toward the dirty sector because South takes on a big share of production of the 
commodity that uses internationally mobile capital.  This is also reflected in the 
composition of the Southern production being more biased toward the dirty commodity. 
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Emission 
Policy 
Size (s) of Home 
economy 
Shape of Income-emission 
relation during transition  
K|Steady C|Steady Z|Steady W|Steady 
ttt CPγτ =  Autarky s=1 EKC 397 26.76 16.24 2.63 
ttt CPγτ =  s=0.56  EKC 143 30.96 6.59 3.17 
ttt CPγτ =  s=0.44 EKC 681.88 24.77 95.48 -0.61 
Table 1.3: Impact of trade on EKC outcomes for different sized home economy 
While the classical sources of comparative advantage provide gains from trade for 
both trading partners, the welfare effects arising solely due to environmental policies and 
capital flows shows that the poorer economy loses both in consumption and in 
environmental quality in free trade compared to the autarky situation. The consumption 
loss for the poor home reflected in the above table is caused by FDI which reduces the 
marginal returns to domestic capital. Other sources of potential gains from FDI in the 
form of employment generation, linkage effects, and knowledge transfer are not present 
in this model. The environmental costs of FDI reflected in the above table are relevant. It 
indicates that in the open economy scenario, the efficient environmental policy should 
also consider the impact it has on the flow of international capital. This however would 
lead to strategic interaction which I have considered elsewhere.11  
The above discussion shows that though the income-pollution shape still shows 
the traditional EKC shape, the implications are widely different for two economies 
having different relative income but follow identical environmental policy.  
                                                 
11
 Please see my second essay “The welfare synergy in bundling international environmental agreements 
with international trade treaties” 
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Another comparative analysis is considered where countries are of equal size but 
have different values of pollution disutility parameter. Please refer to appendix 1F for 
detailed exposition of this scenario.  
Having looked at scenarios where an economy is continuously either in autarky or 
in trade, I turn my attention to the situation where an economy makes a transition from 
autarky to trade.  
 
4G. TRANSITION FROM AUTARKY TO TRADE: 
The transition from an autarky income-environment relation to an open-economy 
income-environment relation generates a jump in income and environmental quality. 
International capital flows from an economy with a large capital stock to a small 
economy with a small capital stock. Also, the income of the economy experiencing 
capital outflows goes up during this transition because the domestically owned capital 
earns higher returns abroad. For the economy with the smaller domestic stock of capital, 
the inflow of capital causes worsening of environmental quality. The growth in income 
will also be slower because the returns to domestic capital decline due to inflow of 
foreign capital. 
In the real world this shift is observed over a period of time in the form of 
dismantling of export-import tariffs or removal of capital flow restriction. I have shown 
that for the EKC relation to emerge in the inter-temporal growth path of an economy, a 
very precarious condition between growth in endowments and growth in taxes has to be 
satisfied and in most general situations of environmental policy such a relationship may 
not emerge. The changes in environmental quality and income due to movement toward 
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freer trade will cause the cross country panel data to exhibit an income-environment 
relation that is not generated due to efficient environmental policy (Refer to diagram 
1.13).  Data from economies that are undergoing gradual transition from autarky to trade 
will behave in the manner described and the observed income-environment relation will 
reflect the EKC pattern although it does not hold for the individual economies. 
 The next three comparative dynamics looks at the impact on EKC of a one-time 
improvement in technology, an increase in world demand for the commodity the country 
has comparative advantage in, and a situation when an economy fulfilling the necessary 
condition EKC might experience a worse environmental outcome compared to its poorer 
trade partner. 
 
4H. DYNAMIC IMPACT OF CLEANER TECHNOLOGY: 
At every time point, there are two opposite forces acting within an economy. One 
is to have more capital to sustain current consumption and to accumulate capital for 
future production and consumption. The other is the dislike for capital due to the 
accompanying pollution. When a country comes in possession of a cleaner technology, in 
the early stages, the reduced emission per unit might trigger such a rate of capital 
accumulation that overall level of pollution is actually higher (refer to diagram 1.14). In 
the long term capital accumulation slows down. Then not only does the cleaner technique 
effect dominate, but the country can grow further due to the already accumulated capital. 
 
4I. EFFECT OF PRICE RISE 
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Since the price of the dirtier good has been normalized to unity, an increase in 
demand for the relatively clean good X would increase the relative price of X, and lower 
the real pollution tax for that sector. As the emission coefficient is very small for this 
industry, the price rise has a small effect. However, this indicates that if prices of a 
commodity increase, the countries specializing in that product will see higher pollution 
compared to other economies (refer to diagram 1.15). 
 
4J. RICH HOME IMPLEMENTING SUBOPTIMAL TAXES: 
When the change in environmental policy is not strong enough to reflect the high 
value of disutility of the rich economy, then the tables might be turned in terms of 
environmental outcome. Suppose the home economy starts trading with a foreign 
economy which is at an early stage of growth and has an efficient environmental policy 
regime in place. Then in the initial periods, the tax might be less in the foreign economy 
causing it to accept home capital similar to the previous scenario. However, with growth 
the taxes in the foreign economy rise efficiently. If the taxes at home do not respond 
sufficiently to home income growth, then it is possible that at a later stage, the foreign tax 
is higher than that at home (refer to diagram 1.16). At this stage home would accept a 
larger share of world capital compared to the poorer but stricter foreign economy. The 
EKC of home instead of consistently lying below that of the poor foreign economy would 
intersect and rise above that of the foreign economy. This once more emphasizes the idea 
that high income in the absence of proper policy is not sufficient to attain optimal 
income-environment outcomes.  
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Even when stricter environmental policies retard production and income, the 
capital stock might grow in order to sustain this production under the stricter and hence 
less productive regime.12 This accumulation of capital might give an illusion of growth 
although production and consumption have gone down. 
It is interesting to see the above results in light of the convergence literature. In 
the present model, in addition to the level of capital, the emissions taxes are another 
determinant of the marginal productivity of capital. The level of taxes again depends on 
the income level of the country. A poorer country has a lower tax and an even higher 
marginal product of capital compared to the same level of capital in a rich country. 
Hence, at the steady states, though the effective marginal productivities are equalized, the 
levels of capital stock do not converge. Since the poorer countries end up employing a 
larger share of world capital, trade is not balanced. The poorer country exports the dirty 
good while the cleaner countries provide (export) factor inputs which are clean. There is 
no further incentive towards convergence. 
 
4K. LESS TARGETED EMISSION TAXES: 
For the scenario of less-targeted environmental policy described in section 3d and 
the optimum capital taxation derived, the numerical simulation result is presented below. 
For model parameters and starting conditions identical with the targeted taxation, the 
diagram below shows the relation between nominal income and emissions for the non 
targeted situation.  
The inverted U shaped relation looks similar to before (refer to diagram 1.17). 
However, a comparison of the targeted and less targeted scenarios in diagram 1.18 
                                                 
12
 Please see appendix 1E for more details 
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reveals that the less targeted tax is too strict and strongly restricts the employment of 
capital, pollution and growth of national income.  
To explain the results depicted in diagram 1.18, it is important to realize that the 
emission taxes calculated in the targeted and the less targeted scenarios are pure 
environmental policies in the sense that they take the pattern of trade as given. The 
emissions policies are not used either to alter the pattern of trade or to change the income 
of the economy in a beggar-thy-neighbor strategy. Thus these policies can be labeled as 
short-sighted in the sense that they do not take into account their effect for international 
trade and domestic income. This becomes strongly apparent during the comparison of 
targeted and less targeted environmental taxes. The optimal environmental taxes derived 
purely on environmental disutility consideration above reduce the income levels greatly 
in the non-targeted set-up because it discourages capital accumulation and also 
international capital flows. The environmental tax is till optimal for the resulting level of 
capital and income in the sense that given the level of income and pattern of trade, the 
optimum level of tax provides greater welfare than others taxation levels. For targeted 
emission taxes, the same force drives the trade outcomes to be so widely different for the 
two economies with different initial relative incomes. While setting emissions taxes 
neither economy takes into account that the emission taxes will affect the volume of 
capital flows, and hence production and income. For a model where the government 
weighs the implications of an environmental policy for trade and income, refer to the 
second essay. The growth aspects are abstracted in that model to focus on the interaction 
of trade and environmental policies.  
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5. U.S. EMISSION DATA INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF THE MODEL 
U.S emissions data for Ammonia, Sulphur Dioxide, Carbon-monoxide, Nitrogen-
oxide, Particulate-material and Volatile-organic-compounds are available from US-EPA 
for the years 1990 and 1996-2001, at the 4 digit SIC level13. Integration of this data with 
domestic production data for those years makes it possible to create the decomposition 
US emission pattern to make it comparable with the predictions of the model14.  
I use the following technique for decomposition: 
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In diagram 1.19, 1990 is used as the initial period and changes are calculated 
relative to 1990. The sum of the available emissions is used as an index of environmental 
quality. The aggregate emission is seen to remain more or less constant over this time 
period. While this in itself does not seem very spectacular, decomposing this change in 
                                                 
13
 Provided by Thomas McMullen, USEPA in private email correspondence.  
14
 This is the NBER productivity data extended till 2002. Provided by Wayne Gray in email 
correspondence. 
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emissions into changes occurring due to change in scale, change in composition and 
change in intensity reveals interesting insights about the prevailing environmental 
standards and about trade patterns.  Over this period growth of the economy, captured by 
the scale effect, would have led to dramatic increases in emissions if it there had not been 
significant improvements in intensity as well as a shift out of dirty industries. This makes 
it evident that in addition to exogenous causes, the effective emission standards across the 
economy have become stricter over time providing incentive to profit maximizing 
producers to use cleaner methods. The composition of domestic production has moved 
towards a cleaner mix of products which reinforce the inference that the strictness of the 
environmental regime has increased over this time. The negative contribution of the 
composition change effect is however less than that due to the change in intensity effects.  
The decomposition pattern predicted by the theoretical model (Section 4A, Pg 27) 
is found to be consistent with the actual decomposition of US emission. We can infer that 
US emissions standards have increased with income which is a necessary characteristic of 
efficient policy regime. Whether it was exactly efficient or not depends on the more 
complicated question of consumer valuation of actual valuation social cost of these 
emissions.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS: 
The present analysis shows that during growth of individual economies a stricter 
environmental standard with growth of the economy is a necessary condition for the 
inverted-U shaped relation between income and emissions to emerge. This is because the 
higher taxes at greater economic prosperity encourages profit-maximizing producers to 
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adopt cleaner technologies, and provides impetus to move to cleaner sectors. For trading 
economies, the differences in the trade pattern cause shifts in the inverted-U shape, but do 
not violate the overall shape of the relation.  
One cannot rely solely on higher incomes as a remedy for environmental 
degradation issues. When emission tax policies do not respond or respond weakly to 
consumer disutility, pollution shows no sign of decreasing at higher income levels. 
Sufficiently high fixed taxes may make the fixed-tax steady state outcomes consistent 
with the steady-state under optimal tax or even avoid the hump shape altogether. 
However the environmental policy embodies the desired tradeoff between growth and 
environmental outcome and too-strict environmental policy imposes unnecessary 
restrictions on growth. 
In a trading economy framework, identical efficient policy regimes will not 
deliver identical environmental outcomes to economies that have different trade and 
capital flow patterns. For an example, the same environmental policy in China would 
result in a different income-environment outcome depending on whether China is trading 
with USA or if it is trading with poorer economies in Africa. For two economies that 
begin international trade starting at different points in their growth path, the implications 
are very different. In absence of other sources of comparative advantage caused by 
difference in factor endowments, the smaller economy will accept foreign capital and will 
experience a worse environmental outcome than its more developed partner. The 
developed economy will be able to invest its capital abroad and use the returns on this 
capital to buy dirty commodities. Using the earlier example, China at any given income 
level will have a worse environmental outcome than USA at historically same levels of 
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per-capita income. This is because the developed nation will have the opportunity to 
delegate the production of dirtier sectors to the developing economies, but when the same 
developing economies achieve a higher level of income they will not have the 
opportunity to delegate the dirtier sectors to some other economy unless they manage to 
find a further less developed economy. This result highlights the fact that predictions for 
individual economies using analyses based on a cross section of countries might be 
misleading.  
Transition of economies from autarky to trade would cause capital to flow from 
developed to less developed economies. This causes the income-environment relation for 
a cross section of countries to exhibit EKC relation though it may not be true for the 
individual economies. 
Additional factors that affect the relationship of environmental outcomes and 
income are pollution disutility awareness, price changes in the sectors that the country 
has comparative advantage in, and the technology of production and abatement. If an 
economy implements a cleaner technology, the effect might not be evident in the short 
horizon. With prevailing emission tax structure, the scale of production might go up to 
such an extent that it overwhelms the cleaner effect. In the longer horizon, the effect of 
the lower intensity will dominate and the economy will also be able to sustain a higher 
income level due to lower expenditure on abatement and a higher acceptable capital stock 
at home.  
The dynamic model developed in this paper can be used to analyze the differences 
in scale of production, composition mix and technology used. It uncovers the 
environmental standards prevailing in the economy as well as effect of international trade 
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on environmental quality. Using these dimensions the model can predict income-
environment relationship that the economy can expect to experience if the environmental 
policy, trade pattern or one or more of the other components change.  
The decomposition of US emissions is analyzed in the light of the model. 
Simultaneous movement toward lower emission intensity and cleaner sectors during 
1990-2001 indicates that the US emissions policy was becoming stricter for this time, 
which is a necessary condition for efficient policy as defined in this model.  
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  Diagram 1.2: Benchmark Environmental Kuznets curve for home country 
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  Diagram 1.3: Decomposition of aggregate emissions into underlying components 
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    Diagram 1.4: Emissions under increasing and fixed emissions taxes 
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  Diagram 1.5: Decomposition of aggregate emissions into underlying components for      
                        fixed emission taxes 
  
 47 
 
    Diagram 1.6: Income emission time path under fixed emission taxes with different  
  relative incomes 
 
 
   
   Diagram 1.7: Income-emission relation when emission taxes are rising insufficiently 
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 Diagram 1.8: Income-emission relation for economies with different absolute  
values of initial income 
 
 
      
 
  Diagram 1.9: Income-emission relation under different physical endowments 
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  Diagram 1.10: Income-emission relation for economy with relative income high  
                          compared to the trading partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Diagram 1.11: Income-emission relation for economy with relative income low  
                          compared to the trading partner 
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  Diagram 1.12: Break down of emissions for economy with relative income low  
                          compared to the trading partner 
 
 
 
 
     Diagram 1.13: Transition from autarky to trade 
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  Diagram 1.14: Dynamic impact of cleaner technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Diagram 1.15: Effect of price rise 
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 Diagram 1.16: Rich home economy implementing suboptimal taxes 
 
 
 
 
 Diagram 1.17: Relation between Pollution and Income with less targeted but efficiently    
 calculated pollution taxes 
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Diagram 1.18: Comparison of tax on emissions and tax on capital 
   
 
 
 
 
    Diagram 1.19: Decomposition of U.S. emissions 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE WELFARE SYNERGY IN BUNDLING INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS WITH  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE TREATIES 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
Co-operation in trade policy improves upon unilateral policy undertaken by 
trading countries and often helps the economies to move closer to a free trade outcome. 
On the other hand, it is also accepted that trade agreements like NAFTA would not have 
been possible if the negotiating parties had not consented to certain environmental side 
agreements. I examine whether simultaneous negotiation of environmental agreements 
will improve the welfare outcomes trade-policy agreements. The analysis will also 
examine whether Pareto superior equilibria exist where both trade partners benefit from 
environment and trade agreements compared to negotiation only of trade policy 
agreement. In the process, issues regarding when environmental policies may be used as 
disguised trade policy and when such a trade-off will not exist, are also laid out. The 
diagram lays out the motivation of this paper more clearly. 
In game theoretic terms, this paper adds negotiation of joint environmental 
standards as a new arm to the trade-agreement game. I address two questions. First, can 
adding the environmental dimension make the co-operative outcome even better than 
trade-only negotiation (i.e. is Ucc>Uc)? Second, can environmental negotiation help 
move countries closer to free trade (i.e. is t*c<tc)? 
                          
 
         Diagram 2.1: Game theoretic representation of existing literature and current model
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW: 
Ludema and Wooton (1994) consider cross border externalities and trade 
liberalization. In a static game setup the authors show that there are two instruments 
available to the governments- trade tariff and abatement expenditure. However they 
consider co-ordination only on the trade frontier. By comparing Nash outcome with free 
trade outcome, they show that co-ordination on the trade frontier embodies domestic 
adjustment of the environmental policy. 
Lisandro, Perroni, Whalley and Wigle (1997) consider a simple interaction of 
trade and environmental policies when South owns the environmental asset on which 
North places a huge existence value. In a static game setup they show that when an 
environmental agreement is linked to trade agreement, the South can use the 
environmental agreements to leverage for trade concessions. 
Regibeau and Gallegos (2004) consider strategic use of trade policies for 
environmental motives. The government uses import tariff to protect firms from 
competition and encourage firms to encourage a cleaner but costly technology. In this 
case, free trade and zero tariffs encourage greater volume of production in the world but 
using dirtier processes. One of their results is similar to that of this model: Countries with 
tight WTO commitments have relatively dirtier production while those with a great deal 
of discretion in trade policy have cleaner production techniques. 
Strategic interaction across governments on the environmental policy dimension 
is  a key feature of the article by Elbers and Withagen(2004). They consider mobile labor 
that is attracted by higher real wages arising due to lax environmental regulations. The 
mobile workforce is simultaneously deterred by higher disutility of pollution. In this 
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setup, governments choose the environmental tax fully cognizant of the effect such policy 
will have on the world prices and attractiveness to mobile factors. The authors define 
environmental dumping as the difference between the non-cooperative Nash taxes and 
the cooperative solution, an interpretation relevant for my results too. 
Copeland and Taylor (2000) examine environmental agreements in a free trade 
regime. They compare the efficiency implications of various emissions reduction rules 
and contrast the free trade outcomes with autarkic outcomes. However, under trade they 
consider only the free trade situation and not an interaction of trade and environmental 
policies.  
Barrett (1994) considers self enforcing international environmental agreements. 
The self enforcement property of the cooperative outcomes is sustained due to the 
infinitely repeated game framework where any deviation carries a threat and no scope of 
renegotiation. He numerically solves his models and finds that when the number of 
countries that shares the resource is large, the gains from cooperation are low. Rubio and 
Ulph (2004) revisit Barrett’s analysis.  Using additional Kuhn-Tucker constraints for non-
negativity of emissions, they find that key results of the original paper are robust.  
Bagwell and Staiger (1997, 2002) explain international trade agreements in a 
simple game theoretic framework. They show that while GATTs provisions essentially 
target a specific level of market access, such a commitment might provide incentives for 
the governments to distort their environmental or labor policies. However, the logic of 
GATT provisions aims at solving inefficiencies by suitably designed trade policies. 
Esty (2001) provides a descriptive analysis of the trade environmental interaction. 
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Maggi (1999) considers trade policy, co-operation and role of multilateral 
institutions in a very elegant framework of repeated games between symmetric countries. 
I use the general framework of this model. In addition to import tariff, I include 
environmental standards as an additional dimension of international negotiation. 
 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL: 
The model looks at local pollutants that are emitted during the production process. 
Examples may include chemicals released into water or particulate matter released into 
air. It seems more likely that trading partners would be concerned with global pollutants 
as it affects all consumers, and would wish to make agreements regarding those. There is 
no direct environmental motive behind an environmental agreement for local pollutants. 
International environmental negotiations regarding local pollutants will be prompted by 
the indirect gains and losses in international trade that these environmental standards 
entail. Local pollutants being independent of direct concern to consumers in foreign 
countries provides a clearer and interesting case of the link between international trade 
and environmental agreements. 
  I consider two goods and two countries: home and foreign. Both countries have 
endowments of both goods. However, each country has a larger endowment of one 
commodity, and a smaller endowment of the other. Lower case variable are used for the 
home economy and upper case variables for the foreign economy. “x” and “y” are the 
endowments of the two commodities for the home economy while “X” and “Y” are the 
corresponding endowments for the foreign economy. “e” and “f” are the emission levels 
for the home economy in the x and y markets while “EE” and “F” are the corresponding 
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emissions by the foreign economy. Home has a larger relative endowment of x and 
exports x while importing y. It sets import tariff “t” in the y market. The foreign economy 
sets import tariff “T” for imports in the x market. 
To incorporate the environmental issues in the standard framework, I assume that 
in the absence of any abatement effort, every unit of “x” is associated with “m” units of 
pollution. If the extent of abatement is “a”, then it is assumed that a proportional amount 
θa of the endowment is used up in the abatement activity, leaving x(1-θa) for 
consumption purposes. The corresponding per-unit emission level is defined as e=k*(m-
a), where k is some multiplicative constant. The government chooses emission level “e” 
based on welfare maximization. The abatement activity decreases the pollution disutility, 
reduces the amount that the sellers have available to sell in the markets and increases the 
price of a commodity by making it scarcer. 
I look at import tariffs as the instrument of international trade policy. Similar to 
Maggi (1999), I abstract from other instruments like export taxes and import subsidies.  
The price that exporters receive is the price at which they sell in the import 
market minus the tariff they have to pay. 
pex=pim-t 
In addition, the government of each country chooses the level of emission 
standards for its production processes. I do not assume that the governments of each 
country are restricted to choosing an identical emission standard for both sectors.  
The demand for each good is given by ppd βα −=)( , where p is the 
domestically prevailing price.  
The demand however is also affected by the disutility caused by the emissions.  
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Instead of assuming an a-priori relation of disutility and prices, I allow the government to 
intervene in creating a market. The government sets the pollution standards by taking into 
consideration the marginal social benefit of reducing the last unit of pollution, and the 
marginal cost of abatement for the last unit of emission. 
The home economy exports x at the price px, imports Y from country B at 
tPp Yy += where t  is the import tariff imposed by home. The foreign economy imports 
X at price TpP xX += where T  is the import tariff rate imposed by the foreign 
economy.  
The market clearing condition for commodity X yields pricing functions. 
)1()1()()( EEmXemxPp XX +−++−=−+− βαβα   
or, 
22
)1()1(2 TEEmXemxpX −
+−++−−
= β
α
     (1) 
Similarly 
22
)1()1(2 TEEmXemxPX +
+−++−−
= β
α
   (2)  
A weighted sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus is used as an indicator 
of social welfare15.  
                                                 
15
  This is a close approximation of the social welfare:  
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When the inverse demand function is defined by relative price without referring to income as in a 
quasilinear welfare function, the above expression can be approximated by: 
∫ +−≈
1
0
111111111 )()}()({))((
x
pxppxpdttppxu  
  
Under the assumption of zero marginal costs, producer surplus is the term outside parentheses on the right 
hand side. 
or, PSCSpxu +≈))(( 11  
 
This assumption of zero marginal cost is valid in the present model with endowments. The approximation 
may be less valid in situation where the marginal costs of production are significant. 
 
  
  62 
Use of consumer and producer surplus is useful in the current model because not 
all of domestic production is consumed domestically and not all of domestic consumption 
is produced domestically. Also, it allows me to analyze a situation where the policy 
maker puts different weights on consumer and producer surplus 
The welfare of home economy from good X consists of the consumer surplus 
from consuming X and the consumer disutility from the emissions associated with the 
production of X and the producers surplus or profits from selling X in the domestic and 
foreign market. 
)1.(]
2
)([
2
emxpwxe
p
u x
x
X +−+−
−
= γβ
βα
    (3) 
where γ is the consumer disutility associated with every unit of emission and w is the 
weight of the producers welfare in the social welfare function 
The welfare to the foreign economy from good X consists of the tariff revenue 
collected on the quantity imported in addition to the other components. The domestically 
prevailing prices are the import prices and the domestic producers of this commodity sell 
only in the domestic market. 
)}1()({)1()(
2
))(( 2
EEmXTpTEEmXTpwex
TpU XX
X
X +−−+−++−++−
+−
= βαγβ
βα
           (4) 
Note that the social welfare function is allowed to have a different weight “w” for 
producer surplus compared to the consumer surplus. The motivation for the differential 
weights given to welfare of producers and consumers is rooted in a political-economy 
logic that the production sector might be able to form organized interest groups that can 
offer political contributions, which politicians value for their potential use in coming 
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elections or otherwise. Helpman and Grossman (1994)16 show that such incentives may 
“induce the government to behave as if it were maximizing a social welfare function that 
weights different members of the society differently, with individuals represented by a 
lobby group receiving a weight 1+a and those so not represented receiving a smaller 
weight of a.” Goldberg and Maggi (1999) 17 empirically test whether different interest 
groups do have different weights in the welfare function that the government uses to 
choose policy. They confirm this and further postulate that the weights are much larger 
than what may be justified by direct contributions, indicating that there might be more 
reasons for the government’s preferential treatment of certain lobby groups. The 
formulation of the government’s welfare function with differential weights encompasses 
the more commonly used scenario where both consumers and producers have the same 
weight as a special case. This allows us to handle a wider spectrum of welfare functions 
for government maximization.  
To compare this model with the more standard models with only tariffs, I keep 
emissions level fixed and examine the properties of the welfare function. The relationship 
between foreign tariff and domestic welfare is found to be as follows: 
dT
dp
pexw
dT
du x
x
x )}.(..{ βα −−=        (5) 
where 0
2
1
<−=
dT
dp x
 
1≥w  implies that domestic welfare is unambiguously decreasing in foreign 
tariffs. This becomes clear when we note that x.e is the effective supply of the 
                                                 
16
 “Protection for Sale”, The American Economic Review > Vol. 84, No. 4 (Sep., 1994), pp. 833-850 
 
17
 “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation”,The American Economic Review > Vol. 89, No. 5 
(Dec., 1999), pp. 1135-1155 
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commodity and ).( xpβα − is the domestic demand. As good x is the export commodity 
of the home country, ).(. xpex βα −> . Hence 1≥w  satisfies the condition dT
dux <0 
 The relation between domestic tariff and domestic welfare for good y is as below: 
]}..).{(}.).[{(
dt
dp
tBfywpBAfypBA
dt
du y
yy
y
−−−−−−=   
  >0   ?       >0       
 
An increase in domestic tariff has costs and benefits associated with it. The direct 
benefit of a higher import tariff is the greater tariff revenue earned. The volume of 
imports reflects the marginal gain and is the first term on the right hand of the above 
expression. Higher import tariffs also raise domestic prices – this reduces consumer 
surplus and increases producer surplus. High tariff-induced high domestic price also 
reduce the volume imported and has a secondary negative impact on welfare. These three 
welfare gains and losses caused by a tariff induced domestic price rise are included in the 
term inside parentheses. The non co-operative tariff is set where the marginal benefits 
equal the marginal costs of a tariff increase, i.e. 
dt
du y
=0. I use the functional values of the 
first-derivatives to figure out the optimal tariff condition. 
)..)23(3(
4
1 YFYfwBt
dt
du y
++−+−=  
The non co-operative tariff is set such that 
dt
du y
==0  and implies 
B
YNNFywnf
t
3
)1()23)(1( −+++−−+
=      (6) 
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If w<1.5, an increase in the import-competing endowment y causes import tariff 
rate to go down. This is because larger domestic endowments imply that the import tariff 
induced lowering of domestic prices has a lower marginal gain for the consumers. 
Conversely if w>1.5, the producers have a stronger weight. Then as effective endowment 
of the import-competing good goes up, welfare-maximizing tariff on imports will go up 
because the producers are better able to meet the domestic demand and hence non-co-
operative welfare maximization implies stronger protection from foreign competition. 
For t lower than optimal, 0>
dt
du y
 domestic welfare increases as domestic tariffs 
rise till a certain level, and then starts declining. The best response domestic tariff is 
positive. 
I find that the second order conditions for convexity of the function are satisfied.  
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        (7) 
Having shown that with fixed emissions, the welfare functions have the standard 
features, I move on to analyze the scenario where the emissions are best responses to the 
tariffs, which is the spirit of the current model. The best response emissions are derived 
from the first order conditions of welfare maximization. 
Best response for e : 0=
∂
∂
e
u
, or ),(| TEEbre br =       
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Best response for f : 0=
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∂
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de br ββ <0 as long as w>2/3  (8) 
As long as producer surplus does not have a very small weight in the welfare 
function, increases in foreign tariffs will be met by a weaker domestic emissions 
standard, to allow the domestic producers remain competitive. 
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dt
df br >0 when w<1.63 or w>7.37 (9) 
For w<1.63, the import competing sector is supported by a higher tariffs on 
imports coupled with a strict emissions standard. Lower tariffs on imports are traded off 
against allowing higher emissions. 
2/3<w<1.63 is the range in which the best response of export emission-standard is 
negatively related to foreign tariff and import-competing emission-standard best response 
is positively related to domestic tariff. 
Consider the relation of welfare with tariff in the scenario where emissions 
standards are chosen as best-responses. For w>2/3, domestic prices of exports are falling 
in foreign tariffs (
dT
dpx <0) and domestic prices of imports are rising in domestic tariffs 
(
dt
dpy >0)18.  
dT
de
xwp
dT
dp
pexw
dT
du
x
x
x
x
.).()}.(..{ γβα −+−−=   <0   (10) 
  >0  <0 >0 <0 
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 Refer to appendix 2 for a proof of this 
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Equation (10) shows that domestic welfare is unambiguously declining in the foreign 
tariff.  The relation between domestic tariff and domestic welfare is as below: 
dt
dfytwp
dt
dp
tBfywpBAfypBA
dt
du
y
y
yy
y )(]}..).{(}.).[{( −−+−−−−−−= γ   
  >0   ?       >0      >0           >0 
The non-cooperative domestic tariff rate is set to maximize domestic welfare: 
dt
du y
=0 
Plugging back the functional values of the first-derivatives mentioned at the beginning of 
derivations into this condition yields: 
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          (11) 
The coefficient on t on the right hand side is positive if w>2/3. When the weight 
to producer surplus is greater the 2/3, import-tariffs lower than the solution 
implies 0>
dt
du y
. Hence domestic welfare is increasing in domestic tariffs till a certain 
level, and declining after the domestic tariff has exceeded the optimum level.  
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 2/3<w<1.63 is the range within which all the conditions are satisfied. When this 
condition is satisfied, the welfare function satisfies all standard properties. The 
permissible range for the weight on producer surplus encompasses the commonly used 
case w=1.  
 The diagram below illustrates graphically the above mathematical conditions. The 
isowelfare functions for the two economies are drawn in the home and foreign tariff 
plane. Holding the partner’s tariff level fixed, each economy’s welfare increases in 
domestic tariff till a certain level and declines beyond that. The loci of the welfare 
maximizing domestic tariff traces out the best response tariff of each economy. The 
diagram also reveals that holding the domestic tariff level fixed, the welfare of each 
economy is unambiguously declining in the partner economy’s tariff level. 
 
 
 
 
  
  69 
 
Diagram 2.2: Iso-welfare functions and best response tariff function in the domestic and 
foreign tariff plane 
 
In the absence of any co-operation, each government unilaterally chooses the 
values of the three policy instruments using the best response function, which unilaterally 
maximize the social welfare function for the economy. 
The model conforms to the beggar-thy-neighbor literature because as seen from 
equations (5) and (10), increased tariffs hurt the trade partner and helps the home country. 
Each economy non-co-operatively will choose a positive tariff as revealed in equations 
(6) and (11) to maximize welfare. This welfare maximization involves extraction of tariff 
revenue, lowering domestic prices that benefit domestic consumers and protecting the 
domestic producers against foreign competition. All these gains to domestic welfare are 
at the cost of foreign welfare. Thus each economy behaves in a “beggar-thy-neighbor” 
manner under non-cooperation. This beggar-thy-neighbor behavior under non-
cooperation is key to the possibility of cooperation. Cooperation is sustained when 
T 
t 
T-best response 
t-best response 
U0 
U1 
U2 
u2 
u1 
u0 
U0<U1<U2 
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welfare loss caused by alteration of non-cooperative domestic strategies is traded off 
against welfare gains as foreign policy shifts from non-cooperative strategies.  
 While equations (5),(6), (10), (11) show the “beggar-thy-neighbor” behavior with 
respect to tariff, the following section explores whether similar incentives prevail in the 
setting of export-emission standards. The relation between foreign welfare and domestic 
export emissions at the non-cooperative solution is given by equation (14). 
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e
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       (14) 
Equation (14) implies that as long as a country has some endowment amount ‘X’ 
of a commodity, and as long as producers get more weight in the planners welfare 
function than consumers (w>1), the economy would gain from its trade partner having a 
stricter environmental standard than what is chosen non-cooperatively. However, if 
producers get a lower weight (w<1), or if the country has a negligible endowment of the 
commodity ( 0→X ), then the country is a net importer of the good and would prefer the 
exporter to implement a lower environmental standard, because the domestic consumers 
would gain from this. The non-cooperative emission level that an economy chooses by 
accounting for disutility of consumers and competitiveness of producers is welfare 
maximizing for the domestic economy but welfare reducing for the trading partner. 
Hence this is also consistent with the “beggar-thy-neighbor” situation.  
 As illustrated above, a reduction in import tariffs and a tightening of emissions 
standards benefits an economy if the changes are made by the foreign economy, but 
reduces welfare if the changes are required domestically. This indicates that there exists 
scope for joint co-operation where welfare losses to self from a domestic policy change 
are more than compensated by welfare gains caused by foreign policy change.  
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4. TRADE NEGOTIATION: 
When cooperation occurs only on the import tariffs the countries no longer choose 
their tariff rates according to the best response functions but according to the negotiated 
tariff rates. However each country still chooses emissions standards as best response to 
the co-operative tariff. This makes the welfare function of each country solely a function 
of the prevailing tariff rates as shown in the derivation of expression (15). 
YX uuu +=  
or, ),,(),,( tFfuTEEeuu YX +=  
or, )),(|),(|()),(|),(|( TTFtfuTTEETeuu brbrYbrbrX +=  
or, )()(),( tuTuTtu YX +=        (15) 
The diagram 2.2 illustrates the iso-welfare curves which are of combinations of (t, 
T) that result in a given welfare level for an economy. 
A cooperative equilibrium that is different from the Nash equilibrium is 
sustainable if there are multiple periods to be considered so that a deviation in one period 
would be followed by retaliation in subsequent periods. The range of such sustainable co-
operative equilibria is such that the discounted loss from future retaliation outweighs the 
gain from deviation in a single period. The incentive compatibility constraint is the locus 
where the gains just equalize the loss. If a country deviates in one period, then its trade 
partner gets to know in the subsequent period and reverts back to the Nash choice for all 
future periods as that is its best response strategy.  
)),((
1
),()(: NCCCCCCCD uTtuTtuTuic −
−
=− δ
δ
    (16) 
where δ is the discount rate 
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Cu is the welfare to the home country under cooperation, Du  is the welfare to home from 
deviation when the foreign country still fulfills its commitment because it does not realize 
the deviation of its opponent. Hence Du - Cu is the one-period gain from deviation. Nu  is 
the welfare to the home country when both parties have reverted back to Nash strategies. 
Thus the right-hand side is the discounted loss from future punishment. The Nash welfare 
is a function only of the parameters of the model and hence is constant. The cooperative 
welfare for the home country is a function of the cooperative strategies of home and 
foreign countries. The best deviation tariff for home depends only on the cooperative 
choices that the foreign economy still adheres to.  
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   Diagram 2.3: Incentive compatibility constraint for the home economy for trade-only     
                         negotiation 
 
Since tariffs are non-negative by assumption, the incentive-compatibility 
constraints (ICCs) of both countries are binding at the cooperative equilibrium.  
Import tariff – 
foreign economy 
IC constraint 
home economy 
Import tariff – 
home economy 
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         Diagram 2.4: Non-cooperative and trade-negotiation outcomes 
 
The ICCs of the two countries must hold with equality both at the cooperative 
equilibrium as well as at the Nash equilibrium. The ICCs intersect at two points. Solution 
of the equations shows the intersection further away from the origin is the Nash solution 
and the intersection closer to the origin is the tariff-cooperation solution. The tariff under 
trade co-operation is lower than the unilateral maximization or Nash outcome. In terms of 
the welfare, cooperation helps attain higher welfare compared to Nash. This can be seen 
in the diagram below by noting that the cooperation attains an isowelfare locus that is 
closer to the vertical axis compared to the Nash isowelfare function. 
Import tariff – 
home economy 
Incentive compatibility 
constraint for foreign economy 
Incentive compatibility 
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         Diagram 2.5: Wefare levels associated with on-cooperative and trade-negotiation    
                                outcomes 
 
The fact that trade policy cooperation improves welfare has been demonstrated by 
various researchers, though without accounting for environmental responses as modeled 
in this section. However a more interesting question is whether incorporation of 
emissions standards within the purview of international negotiation has the possibility of 
improving the welfare outcomes further. The numerical values for welfare improvement 
are tabulated later for a comparison of non-cooperative outcome, tariff cooperation and 
tariff-and-emission cooperation. 
 
5. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATION: 
A country might wish that its imports meet a certain environmental standard of 
production. For example, a country might not wish to import fish from a country that 
catches fish by an inexpensive method that causes large damage to the ecological system 
within the country of production. However, it is unlikely that the standards would be 
subject to international scrutiny if the country has a small industry that produces and 
Import tariff – 
home economy 
Incentive compatibility 
constraint for home economy 
NASH 
Cooperation 
Iso-welfare with 
NASH outcome 
Iso-welfare with 
tariff co-operation 
Import tariff – 
foreign economy 
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caters only to the domestic market and causes local damage. So even with international 
agreement, I allow flexibility to the countries to choose the environmental standards for 
the import-competing industry using a best-response behavior. The following diagram 
depicts the idea that the environmental policy for the import-competing-sector is chosen 
as a best response to the negotiated tariffs and the export emission standards. The shaded 
plane represents the best response of the import competing sectors emissions as a 
function of import tariffs and export emissions. For an {import tariff, export emission} 
combination, the unique import-competing-best-response-emissions can be read off from 
the shaded plane. 
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  Diagram 2.6: Emissions in the import competing sector as a best response to import      
                        tariffs and emissions of export sector 
 
Substituting out import-competing-sector-emissions with the use of the best 
response function the welfare of a country now is a reduced-form function of the 
negotiated tariff rates as well as negotiated export emission standards.  
Export emission 
Import tariffs 
Emission in 
import competing 
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The following diagram shows the welfare map for the home country, holding the 
import tariff  ‘t’ of the home country and export emission ‘F’ of the trading partner at 
fixed levels. The diagram reveals that domestic welfare increases in domestic import 
tariff till a certain level of the tariff and declines thereafter. The same is true for the 
export emissions choice19. This is consistent with the best response tariff choice and best 
response export emission policies. If the trading partner were to keep its policies 
unchanged, then the economy could have attained maximum welfare denoted by the 
central iso-welfare locus by implementing its best response policies. 
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   Diagram 2.7: Isowelfare functions relevant for trade-and-environment negotiation 
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Consider an infinitely repeated game. Let ( ),, CCC tfe  denote the policy values 
that can be sustained with co-operation for home. The corresponding values for the 
foreign economy are ( ),, CCC TFEE . 
Welfare from co-operation is denoted by: ),,(),,( CCCYCCCCXCC tFfuTEEeuu +=  
These levels are sustainable if, on deviation, the loss is greater than the gains. In 
the first period of deviation, the trade partner continues to satisfy the co-operative 
policies oblivious to the defection by the other, while the deviator gains by choosing the 
policy values that would be best response to the trade partner’s co-operative policies. In 
the next period, everyone gets to know of this deviation and all respond in the best-
response manner to the opponents, ending up in the Nash equilibrium for the periods 
thereafter. 
Let us consider the problem of the home country. The international agreements 
are made on import tariffs  ‘t’ that the home country imposes on its imports of good Y, 
and on the environmental standard ‘e’ for the good X that the country exports. The 
country always gets to choose ‘f’ as its best response to the prevailing situation. I denote 
the single period deviation values by ( ),, DDD tfe . Since the welfare has been modeled 
such that it is separable in the goods, each country just needs to consider the market in 
which it is deviating, to decide on its best response. While choosing the deviation on the 
environmental policy of its exports, the home economy takes the policies of the foreign 
economy at the co-operative levels. Since the trade partner will get to know about the 
deviation in the next period, if home decides to deviate it will deviate in both markets 
simultaneously because the punishments would follow in both markets.  
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In market X, home country chooses, ),( CCD TEEbre =     (17) 
In market Y, home deviates on the import tariffs it imposes. In market Y, home also 
adjusts its own domestic emissions in best response to its own tariff deviation:  
),( CDD Ffbrt =          (18) 
),( CDD Ftbrf =          (19) 
This pair of equations can thus be solved just in terms of the trading partner’s co-
operative commitments. )( CDD Ftt = , )( CDD Fff =     (20) 
The associated welfare from deviating is named as before. 
Using equations (17) and (20), I can rewrite the welfare from deviation in terms of the 
co-operative values of the policies. 
),,(),,( DCDYDCCDXDD tFfuTEEeuu +=       (21) 
or, ))(,),((),),,(( CDCCDYDCCCCDXDD FtFFfuTEETEEeuu +=  
)(),( CYDCCXDD FuTEEuu +=  
Further, we need to recognize that the foreign economy chooses the 
environmental strategy CEE  on the domestic production of its import commodity X in 
best response to what it believes is the state of the market. 
or, )()),,(( CYDCCCCXDD FuTTeEEuu +=  
or, )(),( CYDCCXDD FuTeuu +=        (22) 
Thus gains from deviating 
ND uug −=           (23) 
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The Nash solution is defined by the parameters of the model. Hence the gains 
from deviating can be thought to be a function only of the co-operative levels of policy. 
The loss associated with this deviation: )}(){(
1 YNXNYCXC
A uuuuL +−+
−
= δ
δ
 (24) 
where δ <1 is the rate at which the next period is valued in comparison to the current 
period. The loss from deviating is thus also a function only of the co-operative levels of 
policy. 
A co-operative equilibrium is sustainable if it is incentive compatible, i.e. there 
should not be incentive to deviate. The loss from deviation should equal or outweigh the 
gains from deviation. 
lgic ≤:  
or, )}(){(
1
)()( YNXNYCXCYNXNYDXD uuuuuuuu +−+
−
≤+−+ δ
δ
  (25) 
The incentive compatibility constraint is a function of the co-operative levels of 
policy. Unlike in the only tariff situation, there are now two choice variables for every 
country and only one constraint. So the constraint itself is not sufficient to solve for the 
equilibrium. To select among the several possibilities that are incentive compatible, it is 
reasonable to assume that the countries will pick policy combination that maximizes the 
welfare of individual countries. 
),),,(|()),,(|,(
,
CCCCbrCYCCCCbrCCXCCte tFtFfuTTeEEeuuMax CC +=  
subject to: 0=ic  and 0=IC  
This implies choosing the point where the welfare function with co-operation is 
tangent to the incentive compatibility constraint. 
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Equations (25), (26) and their foreign economy counterparts together determine 
the sustainable welfare maximizing co-operative policy choice. The table below provides 
the strategies chosen and welfare outcomes for a specific parameterization of the model.  
 Nash Co-operation 
only on import 
tariffs 
Cooperation on 
import tariff and 
export emissions 
Welfare level 0.37228 0.372298 
(+0.005%)* 
0.372625 
(+0.093%)* 
 
Import tariff 0.0804 0.0201 0.0655509 
Export Emissions 0.5147 0.53778 0.232952 
Parameters: x=Y=1.5, y=X=1, α=1, β=1, m=1, γ=0.01, ρ=0.99, w=1.25 
* Percentage increase in welfare over Nash welfare level. 
Table 2.1: Comparison of non-cooperation, only trade and trade-and-environment 
negotiation outcomes 
 
 
The diagram below reflects these outcomes. Under symmetric equilibria, the iso-
welfare loci of a country are drawn under the restriction that the values of the two choice 
variables for the foreign country is same as that for the home country at all points in the 
{import tariff, export emission} plane. 
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  Diagram 2.8: Comparison of outcomes under non-cooperation, only-trade negotiation  
and trade-and-environment negotiation 
 
For the only-tariff-cooperation solution the tangency condition is not relevant. 
The co-operative tariff solution and the corresponding best response export-sector 
emission are indicated in the diagram in the form of dashed lines. The {import-tariff, 
export-sector emission} combination lies within the iso-welfare function represent the 
Nash welfare level. This implies that cooperation on tariffs-only improves welfare 
relative to no-cooperation. Also the cooperative tariff level is lower than the non-
cooperated tariff level but the environmental degradation is worse with the tariff-only 
agreement.  
Compared to the Nash outcome, the tariffs are lower, emissions are lower and 
welfare is higher for each country when there is co-operation on the tariffs and 
environmental standards. The model indicates that co-operation on both frontiers 
improves welfare greatly as shown by the corresponding iso-welfare function being more 
Export emission 
Nash Env-tariff co-op 
Import Tariff 
Cooperation on tariffs only  
Export-sector emissions  as 
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towards the center. However, the tariff-only cooperation was able to attain larger cuts in 
tariffs compared to tariff-environment co-operation. The reason for this is that, left to 
their own devices, each country chooses a more polluting emission level in export 
commodity production and hence is willing to be more flexible on tariff cuts. However, 
when emissions are also part of the negotiation, stricter emissions requirements make the 
countries less willing to cut tariffs. This result is consistent with the findings of Regibeau 
and Gallegos (2004).They find that countries with tight WTO commitments have 
relatively dirty production while those with a great deal of discretion in trade policy have 
a clean production. 
 
6. ASYMMETRIC ECONOMIES: 
For symmetric economies, the demand function was derived from maximization 
of consumer surplus      because the symmetry assumption automatically 
led to balanced trade outcomes. However, balanced trade requirements have to be 
explicitly taken into account when analyzing asymmetric economies. 
 
This leads to the demand functions having the form:       ,  
where the values of the Lagrange multipliers enter into defining the demand functions. 
The Lagrange multipliers differ by country. So there are two new variables in the system 
λ1, λ2 that need to be solved and one new equation: either one of the budget constraints or 
the balanced trade equation that was not explicitly considered before (the second budget 
equation is redundant by the Walras law). Hence, unlike in the Maggi model, the absolute 
prices of the two commodities cannot be solved. Only the relative price can be solved, 
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which is consistent with standard trade models. Inserting the demand equations for the 
quantities consumes, the budget equation for the home economy can be written as: 
 
or,  
 
A similar solution exists for λ2.  
Plugging back the solutions for the quantities consumed, relative prices and the 
Lagrange multipliers into the social welfare function, I find it to be a function of the 
effective endowments as shown by expression (27).  
 
           (27) 
Maximization of the welfare function entails specific effective endowments. As 
the physical endowments of an economy changes, the economy will change its emissions 
levels to attain the target effective endowments. Larger absolute sizes of the economies in 
terms of physical endowments do not change the equilibrium outcomes.  
 An economy with more endowments can be rich which is associated with high 
aggregate pollution. It can reduce its emissions which also simultaneously reduces 
effective endowment. The equilibrium represents the optimal tradeoff between emissions 
and income. 
 
7. GLOBAL POLLUTANTS:  
If the emissions have an impact beyond the local economy, it would affect the 
results. Columns 2 and 3 present results for a global pollutant, with column 3 embodying 
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a greater degree of international spillover. Column 1 is the case of zero spillover (or local 
pollutant) and provides the benchmark for comparison. “g” represents the degree of 
international effect of a pollutant. 
 g=0 g=0.01 g=0.02 
Welfare under non-cooperation 0.37228 0.361664 0.351047 
Import tariff under non cooperation 0.0804 0.0804 0.0804 
Export Emissions under non cooperation 0.5147 0.5147 0.5147 
Welfare under only trade negotiation 0.372298 0.361674 0.351052 
Import tariff under only trade negotiation 0.0201 0.03439 0.0486766 
Export emissions under only trade 
negotiation 
0.53778 0.532324 0.526869 
Welfare under trade and environment 
negotiation 
0.372625 0.362119 0.351633 
Import tariff under trade and environment 
negotiation 
0.0655509 0.0766432 0.0873372 
Export emissions under trade and 
environment negotiation 
0.232952 0.190567 0.147253 
Table 2.2: Comparison of outcomes for local and global pollutants 
When economies choose their actions non-cooperatively, international 
spillovers do not influence their domestic choices. This results in the non-cooperative 
strategies with local and global pollutants to be identical. However, the welfare level 
decreases because the emission choice of each economy affects other economies more 
strongly as the global effect get stronger. This indicates that given any opportunity of co-
operation, every economy will more strongly try to influence the emission level of the 
partner economy, greater the global spillover effect. Tariff co-operation is consistent with 
this prediction. For pollutants of more global nature, the tariff cut is smaller and the best 
response emissions level is lower. Negotiating on tariffs, the countries do not push for 
very large tariff cuts because they realize that it would be accompanied by greater 
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emissions which is undesirable by the trading partner. In the situation of tariff-and-
emission co-operation, stronger global impact implies the economies agree to lower 
emissions level though it requires a higher co-operative tariff level to sustain it. 
Compared to non-cooperative outcomes, the emission level goes up when economies 
negotiate only on tariffs and emission level is held down when it is explicitly included in 
the negotiation similar to local pollutants. As lower emissions have a higher tariff 
tradeoff, the tariff cuts possible with emission-and-tariff negotiation is less than under the 
only tariff negotiation. 
 
8. CONCLUSION: 
This repeated game model shows that a joint negotiation on tariffs and 
environmental standards improve welfare compared to negotiating a trade treaty only. If 
the policymaker has a higher weight on producer welfare relative to consumer welfare, 
then compared to non-cooperation, trade-and-environment cooperation improves 
environmental standard while only trade negotiation will deteriorate the environmental 
quality. In this model, larger physical endowments result in high income and high 
pollution. The optimal tradeoff between income and emissions result in an optimal 
effective endowment which is independent of the actual physical endowments of an 
economy. Comparison of global pollutants with local pollutants shows that non 
cooperative behavior is same in both scenarios. Under cooperation, economies push 
toward stricter emissions standards for pollutants with more global impacts, though this 
comes at a cost of a smaller tariff reduction. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE POLLUTION HAVEN DISGUISED IN FACTOR INTENSITIES 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
The pollution-haven hypothesis states that, ceteris paribus, production of dirty 
goods shifts to countries with weaker environmental standards. This is because strict 
environmental quality requirements increase the cost of production of dirty goods and put 
these countries at a comparative disadvantage.  There exists a vast empirical literature 
studying the pollution-haven hypothesis. Though the idea is intuitively appealing, 
empirical evidence has eluded researchers for a long while. These studies mainly use 
cross-section data from poor countries with weak environmental standards and developed 
countries with strict environmental standards. Country-specific factor endowments are 
included to control for the Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek (henceforth HOV) basis for trade. 
However the evidence is at best mixed and the sign of the coefficient is often found to be 
opposite of the expected direction. Only recently, studies using panel data have been able 
to find significant pollution-haven coefficients though the estimates are still suspected to 
be too small compared to anticipated true effects of abatement costs. The theoretical 
framework that the empirical literature refers to is the marginal-cost consideration: 
environmental strictness affects the marginal cost. With trade, the equalization of price 
leads to equalization of marginal cost and hence a reallocation of the dirty good to the 
environmentally slack countries. I start with the inspection of the theoretical model to 
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uncover whether the apparently simple marginal cost consideration is obscuring a larger 
picture.  
HOV hypothesis predicts pattern of trade based on factor endowments. The 
pollution haven hypothesis predicts that stricter countries should produce fewer of the 
dirty goods. This paper looks at the interaction of the abatement effects with the factor 
endowment effects. I find that whether the effect of stricter environmental regime on 
production is similar or opposite to the traditional pollution-haven effect depends 
critically on the factor intensity of the dirty good under consideration. In the process, the 
model also shows that different abatement standards lead to deviation from factor price 
equalization of physical inputs.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW:  
Tobey (1990) uses a cross-sectional Heckscher-Ohlin model to study trade 
patterns in five highly polluting sectors. He finds that if one controls for differences in 
resource endowments, differences in regulatory stringency have no measurable effect on 
international trade patterns in these industries. The study consists of five cross-section 
regressions (one for each sector) of net exports on characteristics of 23 countries. The 
measure of environmental stringency is an ordinal ranking of countries based on a 1976 
UNCTAD survey where questionnaires were sent to national officials in developed and 
developing countries. 
Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) surveys and critiques the large literature on 
the pollution-haven. The literature is largely empirical in nature. Based on the type of the 
dependent variable, the survey classifies the literature into three segments: those that 
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explain the location choice of firms, those that analyze the level of production of dirty vs. 
clean goods, and those that examine the international movement of inputs mainly capital. 
In this essay, I build a theoretical model and empirically test an approach that addresses 
the second question: the influence of environmental standards on production pattern.  
Levinson and Taylor (2004) use panel data of US trade with Mexico and with 
Canada in two equations, control for endogeneity of pollution abatement costs and 
unobserved industry characteristics. They find that industries which faced large increases 
in abatement cost were also the ones that had a greater increase in import volume 
indicating that these industries had shifted abroad. 
Malatu, Florax and Withagen (2004) provide an empirical investigation of the 
effect of tighter environmental regulation. They claim that firm characteristics influence 
the impact of a stricter regulation. They state that output from industries that have lower 
fixed costs and higher labor intensity are likely to show a stronger impact of stricter 
regulation. They do not refer to a theoretical framework to validate their claim. My 
theoretical model shows that while it is true that impact of regulation should differ by 
industry characteristics, there is a more involved pattern than the simple rule of thumb 
that they claim. Their empirical result is somewhat mixed. While they find evidence that 
the impact of regulation varies across industries, the signs on the coefficients are often 
paradoxical. My paper may be thought of as a further step to find consistent and 
meaningful differences across industries. 
Javorcik and Wei (2004) examine sensitivity of FDI to cross-industry differences 
in regulatory impact. Using a sample of 143 firms they find that the sign and significance 
level of the two pollution haven terms present in their estimation models varies across 
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specifications. While the coefficient for host country’s environmental stringency is 
significant and negative, the coefficient on an interaction term of host country stringency 
with industry level dirtiness is neither significant nor uniformly signed. These results 
indicate that while FDI is deterred by tight environmental standards, the effect of this for 
dirty versus clean industries is not different. Hence, their analysis, given the way it has 
been formulated, does not provide support for the pollution haven hypothesis. 
Cole and Elliott (2005) mention factor intensity of dirty industries in their study 
of outbound FDI from USA. They assume dirty industries are capital intensive and in 
their regression equation they treat the dirtiness indicator and the capital intensity as two 
separate variables. They interpret the positive coefficients on the dirtiness indicator and 
on the capital-intensity variable as evidence for pollution haven effect. While the 
significant coefficient on dirtiness indicator supports pollution haven hypothesis, the 
coefficient on capital intensity may arise because capital intensive sectors would attract 
more capital.  
 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL: 
Starting with the basic HOV model, I include pollution and abatement 
considerations. I find implications of this model using the hat-algebra mathematical 
technique popularized by Jones (1965) in his mathematical exposition of magnification 
effects.  
I start with a 2X2 HOV framework. The two inputs are capital and labor. The two 
goods are X, the clean good and Y the dirty good. The production of the dirty good 
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necessitates some abatement effort as dictated by the exogenously given state of 
environmental stringency. Let A denote the level of abatement activity being undertaken. 
Full employment relations: 
AaXaYaK AKXKYK ++=   where a’s are the input coefficients 
AaXaYaL ALXLYL ++=  
The environmental strictness policy determines that every unit of Y is to be 
accompanied by “e” units of abatement activity A. Then A=e*Y. Using this, I rewrite the 
full employment conditions. 
(1) XaYaeaK XKAKYK ++= )*(  
(2) XaYaeaL XLALYL ++= )*(  
In order to sell at the international prices, the producers of Y have to consider the 
abatement expenditure in addition to the direct production expenditure.  
(3) )( waraewarap ALAKYLYK +++=  
(4) wara XLXK +=1    where p is the price of Y relative to X 
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In the two panels of Diagram 3.1, R is the endowment point. The dashed line 
captures the relative factor intensity of the vector sum Y+eA. The diagram depicts the 
case where the abatement technology A uses only K. The above two panels roughly 
describe the different cases I am trying to show mathematically. 
Panel 1: If the dirty industry Y is more K intensive than X, then stricter abatement 
results in an increased production of the clean good which also implies a lower 
production of the dirty good given a fixed endowment of labor. 
Panel 2: Instead if the dirty industry Y is more L intensive than X (the rays 
indicating the production activities X and Y are reversed) then stricter abatement results 
in increased production of the dirty good and a decreased production of the clean good. 
L, Y*aYL, X*aXL 
K K 
aYK/aYL 
aXK/aXL 
aXK/aXL 
R R 
(aYK+e*aAK)/aYL 
O O 
(aYK+e*aAK)/aYL 
L, Y*aYL, X*aXL 
aXL *X0 aXL *X1 aYL *Y0 aYL *Y1 
aYK/aYL 
Diagram 3.1: Effect of abatement activity on production, with different factor intensity of 
abatement activity 
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For the purpose of intuitive motivation, several simplifications are embodied in 
the above diagram. For example the factor prices and hence the production rays before 
and after abatement are kept unchanged and abatement is assumed to be solely capital 
using. A mathematical approach allows for a more comprehensive analysis.  Equations 
(1) –(4) above are relevant for the mathematical exposition. 
Define input coefficients b to be the sum of the production and associated 
abatement activity input coefficient of Y. 
)*( AKYKYK aeab +=  
)*( ALYLYL aeab +=  
The equations (1)-(4) are rewritten as: 
(1.0) XaYbK XKYK +=  
(2.0) XaYbL XLYL +=  
(3.0) wbrbp YLYK +=  
(4.0) wara XLXK +=1  
 
Then the percentage-change form equations are identical to the four fundamental 
equations of HO framework from Jones (1965): 
(1.1)      }{
^^^^^
XLXLYLYLXLYL abLXY λλλλ +−=+  
(2.1)      }{
^^^^^
XKXKYKYKXKYK abKXY λλλλ +−=+  
(3.1)      }{
^^^^^
YKYKYLYLYKYL bbprw θθθθ +−=+  
(4.1)      }{
^^^^
XKXKXLXLXKXL aarw θθθθ +−=+  
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ijθ  is the share of expenditure on j-th input in the i-th sector. ijλ  is the share of 
industry i’s use of input j. The ijij λθ ,  in the above equations differ from the standard 
HOV equations in the sense that the matrices comprise of bij which are sum of the 
production abatement coefficients for Y instead of only the production coefficients aij .  
To derive the effect of abatement standards, it becomes important to break the 
newly defined variables into their underlying components. 
e
de
eaa
ea
eaa
daeda
eaa
deadaeda
eaa
eaad
b
dbb
ALYL
AL
ALYL
ALYL
ALYL
ALALYL
ALYL
ALYL
YL
YL
YL
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=
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=
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==
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)(^
 
or, 
^^^
esb ALYLYL += α   
ALYL
AL
AL
eaa
ae
s
+
≡
*
 is abatement’s share in total expenditure on labor for Y 
YL
^
α  reflects the partial change in YLb
^
 only due to factor price changes and not the part 
caused by the exogenous 
^
e  
Similarly 
^^^
esb AKYKYK += α  where 
AKYK
AK
AK
eaa
ae
s
+
≡
*
 
I rewrite equations (3.1) in terms of these components: 
(3.1’)     )}()({
^^^^^^^
esesprw AKYKYKALYLYLYKYL +++−=+ αθαθθθ  
There is no corresponding version for equation (4.1) as the X industry is a clean sector 
without any abatement requirements. 
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The cost minimizing envelope condition ensures that the slope of isocost equals 
the slope of isoquant. 
w
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(5.1)      0
^^
=+ YKYKYLYL αθαθ  
(6.1)      0
^^
=+ XKXKXLXL aa θθ  
I use the cost minimizing conditions (5.1) and (6.1) in equations (3.1’) and (4.1), 
to derive equations (5.2) and (6.2). While (4.1) reduces to the standard form, the 
exogenous changes 
^
e  do not disappear from the RHS of (3.1’).  
 
4. EFFECT ON INPUT PRICES: 
To emphasize the effect of change in strictness 
^
e , I abstract from the change in 
relative prices (
^
p =0). This is equivalent to a small-country scenario where any change in 
production at home does not affect world prices. 20 
(5.2)      
^^^
}{ essrw AKYKALYLYKYL θθθθ +−=+  
(6.2)      0
^^
=+ rw XKXL θθ  
                                                 
20
 This assumption is not a necessary part of any of the results and can be brought back in without any 
complication. 
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or, 
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The abatement activity causes differences between the factor intensity of 
production of Y versus the gross input requirement, defined as input required for 
production as well as abatement for Y. However, I assume that this gross input 
requirement does not change the factor intensity ranking of Y with respect to X.  
(7.1)     
^^^ }{)( essrw AKYKALYL
θ
θθ +−
=−     
If Y is K intensive, then θ is negative and )(
^^
rw− >0 
The changes in the absolute prices are provided in equations (7.2) and (7.3): 
(7.2)     
^^ }{
e
ss
w AKZKALZLXK
θ
θθθ +−
= ,  
(7.3)     
^^ }{
e
ss
r AKZKALZLZK
θ
θθθ +
=  
If dirty good Y is K intensive, then θ <0, 
^
w >0, 
^
r <0 with increased strictness 
^
e >0 
If dirty good Y is L intensive, then θ >0, 
^
w <0, 
^
r >0 with increased strictness 
^
e >0 
These mathematical results illustrate that starting with the original factor prices an 
increased abatement requirement raises the cost of production of the dirty good. For an 
unchanged world price p, and the economy still producing both goods, the input prices 
need to change to accommodate this additional component. If the dirty good is K-
intensive, then the price of capital goes down. Simultaneously the price of labor goes up 
in order to keep the total cost for the labor-intensive clean good unchanged. If the dirty 
good is L-intensive, then the additional abatement cost requires the price of labor to fall. 
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The price of capital rises in order for the costs of the clean good to remain equal to the 
unchanged prices. 
In the international trade context with factors immobile across countries, the 
above factor price changes imply that the factor prices for the physical inputs capital and 
labor are not equalized across countries.  Referring back to the standard H.O.V. model it 
is easy to identify that this happens because the assumption of identical technology across 
countries fails here. Although the production technology for X,Y and abatement is 
assumed to be the same, the cost of production of Y is essentially a weighted sum of the 
direct production cost of Y and the indirect abatement cost. Since the weights vary across 
countries based on the exogenous environmental standards, the overall production 
technique for Y is different across countries.  
Comparing with the Kenen-Conway concept of “improved endowment” (see 
Conway 1997), the current model has an almost parallel concept of “effective 
endowment” which is defined as the amount of endowments effectively available for 
actual production purposes. Hence subtracting out the endowments used for abatement 
use from the total physical endowments defines the effective endowments. 
To make the point clear, let us use the following matrix notations: 
X: production vector 
V: physical endowment vector 
VS: effective endowment vector 
P: vector of price of final goods 
H: Technology matrix of producing the final goods 
A: vector of the quantities of the two inputs used for abatement purposes 
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WS: Vector of the prices of the effective endowments 
In this scenario, the vector of prices of the effective endowments (WS) is the 
same as the vector of prices (W) of the physical endowments. VS=V-eAX where e 
denotes the level of strictness and HX=VS 
The parallel result that the prices of the effective endowments are equalized does 
not follow through here because unlike the Kenen model where the third commodity is 
non-traded good, in this model the abatement activity is embodied in the traded dirty 
good. This is similar to difference in production technology across two countries being 
embodied in the cost of producing a same homogenous good. So the price of Y must 
cover the cost of the entire bundle.  
HTW≠P 
Instead (H+eA)T W=P 
This re-emphasizes the fact that a difference in the technology of production 
drives the difference in input prices.  
 
5. CHANGE IN PRODUCTION: 
The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the X and Y sector is 
defined as in the Jones derivation.  
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Change in output from equations (1.1) and (2.1): 
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The change in input requirement coefficient for the dirty industry Y is broken into 
the change in input requirement for production and for abatement. 
or, 
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The elasticity of substitution of the inputs allows me to substitute the change in 
input coefficients as functions of the input prices. 
(8.2)      
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YKYLYXKXLXL σθλσθλδ +≡  and YLYKYXLXKXK σθλσθλδ +≡ are the percent savings in 
factor use associated with one percent rise in relative factor price 
Assuming fixed endowments, the above system reduces to (8.3). 
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I consider the change in relative production due to a change in abatement 
strictness in an economy. 
 (9.1)   )]()()([)(
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To get an expression of the relative change in outputs solely as a function of the 
change in abatement strictness 
^
e , I substitute out )(
^^
rw− in terms of 
^
e  using equation 
(7.1): 
(9.2)    
^^^
)]()([)( essssXY AKYKALYLSALYLAKYK θθσλ
λλ
+−
−
=−  
 
where 
θλ
δδ
σ
)( KL
S
+
≡ . 
 
The determinants λ and θ  have the same sign always, whether positive or 
negative. This implies 0>Sσ . Hence the second term is always negative. This implies 
that irrespective of the factor intensities of productions, an increase in strictness has a 
tendency to affect input prices which in turn indirectly increases the production of the 
clean good X relative to the production of the dirty good Y. This conforms to the 
traditional pollution haven production effect.  
For example, if the dirty industry is K-intensive, we know from equations (7.2) 
and (7.3) that stricter abatement requirements will reduce the price of capital and increase 
the wage rate. This provides incentives to producers in both industries to move towards 
the cheaper capital and free up labor. This would encourage the production of the labor- 
intensive good which in this instance is the clean good and a reduction of the capital-
intensive dirty good. On the other hand if the dirty industry is labor-intensive equations 
(7.2) and (7.3) indicate that the additional abatement requirement will reduce the wage 
rate and increase the price of capital. This provides incentive to producers in both 
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industries to move towards the cheaper labor and free up capital. This in turn would 
encourage the production of the K-intensive good which in this case is the clean good and 
a reduction of the labor intensive dirty good. So in both cases we see that the change in 
input prices always encourages a decline in the production of the dirty good thus 
bolstering the traditional pollution haven type of outcome. 
Now let us turn our attention to the first right-hand term in equation (9.2). If Y is 
K intensive then λ <0. The first term will be positive if: 
AKYKALYL ss λλ >  
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Thus, when the dirty good Y is K-intensive relative to the clean good X, if the K-
intensity of the abatement activity is less(greater) than the overall K-abundance of the 
economy an increase in strictness will directly favor(deter) the relative production of the 
K-intensive dirty good. Alternately when the dirty good Y is L-intensive relative to the 
clean good X, if the K-intensity of the abatement activity is less(greater) than the overall 
K-abundance of the economy an increase in strictness will directly deter (favor) the 
relative production of the K-intensive dirty good. So we see that in two cases out of four, 
the direction of change in pattern of production is opposite to the traditionally held 
prediction- an increase in the abatement level in an economy may increase the share of 
the dirty good in the production. 
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Starting with the system (8.3) I now look at the absolute levels of production 
instead of the relative levels of production: 
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To get a clearer idea of the above expressions, let us start with the effect on 
outputs in the absence of effects of factor price changes. 
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On simplifying the expressions within the brackets, I find that if Y is relatively K 
intensive i.e., || λ <0 then 
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Case 1: The abatement activity is more K intensive than Y, ie 
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Outcome: 0,0 <∂>∂ YX  The traditionally expected pollution haven result 
Case 2: The abatement activity is less K intensive than X, ie 
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Outcome: 0,0 >∂<∂ YX  Opposite to the traditionally expected pollution haven result 
Case 3: The K intensity of abatement activity is between that of Y and X, ie 
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Outcome: 0,0 <∂<∂ YX  
Next consider Y being relatively L intensive, i.e., || λ >0. Then 
AL
AK
YL
YK
XL
XK
a
a
a
a
a
a
>> provides a traditional pollution haven direction of production change 
while 
YL
YK
XL
XK
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AK
a
a
a
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a
a
>> moves the production in direction opposite to traditional 
pollution haven expectations i.e., toward a higher relative production of the dirty good. 
To visualize the above results using real trade outcomes we can think of a labor 
abundant country that uses dirty technology in its export sector to compete in the world 
market. Suppose this country makes its abatement requirements stricter and the 
abatement investment requires mainly capital in the form of end-of-pipe abatement 
methods. This would make the scarce capital endowment even scarcer under the 
assumption of internationally immobile inputs, increasing the production of labor 
intensive dirty good in a Rybczynski type of effect. This would show up in the data as an 
apparent contradiction to the pollution haven expectation. 
Expressions (10.2) and (11.2) are expressions for production change where the input 
price change has been incorporated. 
(10.2)
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Comparison of (10.2) with (12.1) shows that the second term on the right hand side 
reflects that changes in factor price further tend to decrease the production of the dirty good 
Y while comparison of (11.2) with (13.1) shows that changes in factor prices encourage an 
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increase in X production, irrespective of the relative factor intensities of the two 
commodities. When the dirty industry and the abatement activity are intensive in the same 
input relative to the clean sector, the effective endowment effect strengthens the effect of the 
factor price movement, leading to the traditional pollution haven type of outcome. When the 
dirty industry and abatement activity have opposite factor intensities relative to the clean 
sector, the effective endowment effect opposes the effect of the factor price movement. The 
relative strength of the two effects determines whether the net effect will be consistent or 
opposite of the traditional pollution haven expectation.  
The above analysis with mobile inputs demonstrates a reason why the pollution haven 
hypothesis has been difficult to justify. If the dirty exports of an economy are labor intensive 
in nature, then an increased environmental strictness, where abatement is largely capital 
intensive, could be reflected as the dirty industries contributing to a larger share of trade 
volume if the effective endowment effect dominates. The above analysis shows how such an 
outcome can be explained using standard theoretical tools.  
 
6. NEGATIVE AGGREGATE INCOME EFFECT: 
Although depending on the factor intensities, stricter abatement standard increases or 
decreases the production of dirty and clean goods, it should be unambiguous for a small 
economy that the aggregate income of the economy should go down as it chooses to move to 
the stronger abatement requirement. I check below whether this is true for the model. 
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The expressions for change in quantities from (10.2) and (11.2) are substituted into the 
change in income expression. 
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To find results from the above expression, I look at the effect of input-price change 
and the effect of effective-endowment-change, on income, separately.   
Effect of environmental-strictness induced change in factor prices: 
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The right hand side of the above expression simplifies to zero21. This means that 
change in input prices does not have a net effect on aggregate income of the economy.  
Reduction in effective endowments caused by stricter abatement standard, even in the 
absence of factor price changes, should be sufficient to reduce aggregate income. So I 
evaluate the change in income caused by effective endowment change terms. 
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The next logical step is to realize that the aggregate income should be reduced 
whether the abatement technology is only labor using, only capital using, or uses both. So I 
                                                 
21
 Please refer to appendix 3 for calculations 
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examine the change in effective-labor (i.e. coefficient on sAL) and effective-capital 
endowment (i.e. coefficient on sAK) terms separately. I find that aggregate income goes down 
whether abatement is capital-using or labor-using or both. Appendix 3 is devoted to the 
derivation and simplification of these results. 
The above results show that change in effect endowments due to stricter abatement 
results in a net decline in aggregate income while the changes in factor prices influence the 
production of the dirty and clean sectors but they do not have any net effect on aggregate 
income. 
 
7. EFFECT ON TRADE PATTERN: 
If both consumption goods are normal goods, then the decline in aggregate income of 
the economy implies a reduced demand for both commodities. For the commodity that 
experiences an increased production and a reduced demand, the net exports will rise (or the 
net imports will fall if the commodity is an import commodity). The commodity that 
experiences a decrease both in production and consumption, experiences a greater decline in 
production compared to the decline in consumption. This results in larger import demand (or 
a smaller export supply). 
 
8. TERMS OF TRADE EFFECT FOR A LARGE COUNTRY: 
Given the altered demands by the economy in the world market as explained above, 
the trade prices would be affected if the economy is a large country. This is similar to the 
transfer problem where a country by transferring a part of its income, may face an 
improvement or deterioration of its terms of trade. In the current stricter-abatement scenario, 
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the income of the economy declines not because it transfers its income but because it uses a 
part of its endowments for clean-up purposes.  
When the production-change equation (10.2) and (11.2) predict that 0,0
^^
<> YX  in 
conformation with the traditional pollution haven prediction, then the income and trade 
changes as described in section 7 imply 0
^
>p .  
Similarly when 0,0
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>< YX  in contradiction to the traditional pollution haven 
prediction, then 0
^
<p .  
If both 0,0
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<< YX  then 
^
p  >0 if decline in net demand for X is greater than decline 
in net demand for Y, i.e., (dI*mpc|X –dX) < (dI*mpc|Y –dY) 
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and consequently in the change in production equations (10.1) and (11.1) 
 
9. WASTE TRADING: 
If the economy can trade waste, then an analysis of the factor intensities of the 
abatement process becomes redundant. Dirty industries sell wastes at a per-unit cost ‘c’ to 
the producers in that sector. Then the only difference between the current model and the 
HOV model would be that the returns to producers in the dirty Y sector would be ‘p-c’ 
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XaYaK XKYK +=  
XaYaL XLYL +=  
waracp YLYK +=−  
wara XLXK +=1  
The rest of the derivation of the model would be similar to the standard HOV 
model with the only difference of having to carry ‘p-c’ around instead of ‘p’. A 
movement to stricter standard would entail a larger cost ‘c’ which is similar to a lowering 
of net price. As effective endowments are unaffected, forces that drove the earlier results 
opposite to the traditional pollution haven expectations are absent. When the economy 
moves to a stricter regime, the net price received in the dirty sector goes down, leading to 
an effect similar to world prices going down in the HOV setup. The altered version for 
equation (9.2) is given by: 
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If world prices are unchanged 
^
0=p  and amount of pollutants goes up as the 
economy moves to the stricter regime, then the expression for change in relative 
production is given below. 
)()(
^^^
ecXY S −=− σ  
When the economy moves to a stricter regime, the cost for the dirty sector of selling 
its wastes goes up, reducing the relative production of the good as expected by the traditional 
pollution haven hypothesis. In the exceptional case where an economy can dump its pollutant 
in another economy without having to pay the destination economy any compensation, the 
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movement to stricter environmental regime has no effect on cost and hence on production. 
The only result would be a larger volume of wastes dumped in the destination economy. 
 
10. THEORY TO HYPOTHESES: 
Having used the mobile-factors general equilibrium model to illustrate the nature of 
underlying forces, it is nevertheless important to realize that the real trade consists of more 
than the simple two good model and that inputs are completely mobile only in the long run. 
The N goods cases can be motivated by the use of a specific factor model which recognizes 
that in the short term, all factors are not perfectly mobile across industries. I assume that 
capital Ki in each sector is fixed in the short run and is the industry specific input. Labor Li is 
assumed to be mobile across industries. This N good, N+1 factor model is more relevant for 
formulating empirically testable hypothesis.  
Jones(1975) provides the mathematical framework for the N good, N+1 factor 
framework. I visualize the N-1 sectors as being dirty and the N-th sector as the clean X 
sector. I do not restrict the changes in capital endowments to equal zero. However, I 
assume that current capital stock change decisions are pre-determined variables.  
KX
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^
Kie  is the change in capital used for abatement activity, per unit of output. 
Straightforward generalization of the 2X2 model would assert that abatement capital in 
all sectors goes up by the same proportion 
^
e  of the sectoral abatement capital share KAis  
which remains unchanged before and after change in policy. This is too restrictive an 
assumption, necessitating the above more general approach. 
 (14.1)     
^^^^^^^
KiXiKiKXi eKKaXY −−+−=− α  
The percentage change form of the price equation (15.1) takes a form similar to 
equation (5.2) from the 2X2 model. The only difference is that similar to change in 
abatement capital, change in abatement expenditure 
^
ie  across sectors is not restricted to 
be proportional 
^
e  to pre-policy abatement expenditure is . 
(15.1)     
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Derivation of equation (15.1) makes use of the tangency of isocost and isoquant 
condition (15.2) identical to equation (5.1) in the 2X2 setup. 
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The elasticity of labor’s marginal productivity curve in each industry is defined as  
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Explicit expressions for changes in the specific factor coefficients KXa
^
and Ki
^
α  
are derived in the manner similar to the 2X2 model by eliminating
^
Liα and 
^
LXα with the 
use of elasticities γ ’s. 
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Substituting (15.3) into (14.1) I get (14.2). 
(14.2)  
^^^^^^^^^^
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The different wage rates prevailing in different industries can be explained as 
every industry having a specific skill requirement of its workers. This skill is assumed to 
be industry specific and not transferable across industries. The demand for skill is 
exogenous to the model and depends on the technology of the industry. The workers in 
each industry are paid a premium for their skill. For example, if the chemical industry 
requires a chemical engineer, then while a decrease in wages might increase the demand 
for chemical engineers, the skill required of every engineer remains unchanged.  
iii lL *=Γ   
where Li is the physical amount of labor, li is the skill level and Гi is the effective labor. 
Wi=w*wi 
Wi is the actual wage rate paid to the workers. It comprises of two parts: w that reflects 
the payment to unskilled homogenous component, and wi which are the mark-ups of the 
sector-specific wage. 
The prevailing technology determines the demand for skill li. Hence wi is 
determined by the supply of the skill. This supply depends on schooling and training, and 
hence like capital stock, is assumed to be predetermined. So while making a production 
decision, the producers take the skill premium they would have to pay (wi) as given. 
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(14.3) 
XiKiiiiLiLiXXLXLXLiLiLXLXi KKeewpwpwXY
^^^^^^^^^^^
)()()( −+−−−+−−−=− θγθγθγθγ  
In equation (14.3) 
^
KAie  is the effective endowment effect similar to the 2X2 
model. It says that if abatement is capital using, where capital stock is predetermined and 
sector-specific then an increase of environmental strictness reduces the effective amount 
of specific capital and hence production. Unlike in the 2X2 model, change in effective 
endowments does not lead to any unexpected results. As capital is sector specific, a 
decrease in effective endowment of capital has an unambiguous tendency to reduce the 
output of the sector.  
The other term involving the abatement effect ie
^
 in equation (14.3) again has 
factor intensity coefficient Liθ  attached to it. This term indicates that for a given elasticity 
of marginal productivity of labor and for a given change of sector level abatement 
expenditure, production in a labor-intensive sector will decline more in response to 
increase in environmental strictness compared to a specific-capital-intensive good. This 
happens because the capital-intensive good has a lower flexibility in responding to 
changes in policy that increase the marginal cost.  
The first right-hand term in equation (14.3) is similar to the factor-price effect 
seen in the 2X2 model. This term involving price and wages reveal that while a given 
increase in wages will have a greater negative impact on sectors more dependant on 
labor, an equal increase in price will favor production in the labor intensive commodity 
as it has greater flexibility to respond. 
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By estimating equation (14.3) I plan to examine the impact of the US Clean Air 
amendment of 1990.  By comparing domestic production before and after 1990, I test 
whether the pollution haven effect, in the new form that I have identified, was important 
in changing the production and hence trade pattern of the USA. 
 
11. DATA AND ESTIMATION:  
I consider a difference-in-difference approach to test the impact of Clean Air Act of 
1990 using equation (14.3). I omit 1990-1991 as years of adjustment. 1988-1989 
comprise my “before” and 1992-1993 comprise my “after” time periods. I use the NBER 
productivity database for quantities and prices of outputs and inputs at the SIC-4 digit 
level and the expenditure to abate air pollution, at SIC-4 level from U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Current Industrial Reports: Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures, MA-200. In my 
exercise, the control group is those industries that have zero emission coefficient. 
Corrugated and solid fiber boxes (SIC- 2653) is taken as a representative of the clean 
sector due to smallest air emission per unit of production over several years The 
treatment group are those industries that have any positive emissions level. 
 Before is time period before 1990 Clean Air amendment. 
 After is the analysis period after 1990. 
I take an average of the variables over two year 1988-1989 to define the “before” 
observation and an average over the two years 1992-1993 to define the “after” 
observation to smooth out year specific aberrations.  
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Regression is done in logs of the variables due the percentage form of the 
theoretical derivation. The terms in the regression results are interpreted with reference to 
the theoretical equation (14.3). The regressors are:  
Price_effect:  )(
^^
iiLiLi wp −θγ , Capital: iK
^
, Eff_endow effect: 
^
KAie , Interaction: 
^
iLiLi eθγ  
 Since not all dirty goods are traded, I identified traded goods using U.S. 
multilateral trade data.. Among 411 SICs at the 4 digit level for the year 1987, this 
process eliminated 63 SICs leaving the analysis with 348 SICs. The analysis based on 
these 348 SICs lead to very similar results to the complete sample. These results are 
presented on the third column of the table. As suggested by the theory, equality of 
coefficients is imposed for the price effect and interaction effect.  
 
  No interaction term With interaction term     Remove non traded SIC 
Price_effect  0.181*   0.182*     0.162* 
(2.97)   (2.98)   (2.57) 
 
Capital   0.5*   0.5*   0.54*  
(5.46)   (5.46)   (5.72) 
 
Eff_endow  -0.025**  -0.025**  -0.023**  
(-1.90)   (-1.90)   (-1.73) 
 
Interaction     -0.182*  -0.162* 
(-2.98)   (-2.57) 
 
Constant  0.020**      0.021**  0.012 
   (1.68)   (1.67)   (0.93) 
________________________________________________________________________
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 10% 
Table 3.1: Effect of environmental policy change on U.S. Domestic production SIC-4 for  
      years 1988-89, 1992 
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The regression coefficients show the expected signs. The price effect has a positive 
effect on production of all industries. A one percent increase in price net of wage 
payments would increase production by 0.18% in an industry whose share of payments to 
labor equals one. However, given that the average labor share Liθ  is 0.11 across sectors, a 
one percent increase in price net of wage payments would increase production by 0.02% 
in the average industry. Capital stock had a positive effect on production of all industries 
with a 1% increase in sector specific capital stock increasing the quantity of production 
by approximately 0.5%. Dirtier industries requiring sector-specific investments show a 
reduction in production of 0.025% for every percentage point increase in abatement 
expenditure. This term is not significant at the 5% level, but is at the 10% level. The 
abatement expenditure and labor intensity interaction term again predicts that a 1% 
increase in abatement costs would decrease production by 0.02% in the average industry. 
The traditional pollution haven hypothesis would consider the decreased 
production due to increased sector specific abatement investment cost as captured 
through the effective endowment effect. This would be found to be 0.025% and also not 
significant at the 5% level. Viewed in this way, pollution haven effect remains elusive. 
However, the highly significant coefficient on the interaction term adds another 0.02% 
reduction in production for every percent increase in abatement expenditure. The 
pollution-haven effect, in this modified guise, has a tangible effect of the 1990 Clean Air 
Amendment of USA. 
In the absence of a-priori information about the elasticity of marginal product of 
labor in each sector, the elasticities have been assumed to be same for all sectors. The 
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percentage change in capital expenditure for abatement has been approximated by the 
percentage change in overall abatement expenditure in each sector22.  
 
12. CONCLUSION: 
The 2X2 theoretical model provides some interesting results regarding the 
pollution haven predictions. Depending on the factor-intensities of production and 
abatement, a stricter environmental regime may, in certain situations, favor the 
production of the dirty commodity which is unexpected in the traditional pollution haven 
hypothesis. For example, if a country specializes in dirty labor intensive commodities, 
and if abatement technology is capital intensive, then a tighter environmental standard 
would make capital scarcer, encouraging the production of the labor intensive dirty 
commodity.  
While the above theoretical result is indicative of production patterns, a 
generalization to the N-commodity scenario provides results that depend on the relative 
importance of more-mobile and less-mobile inputs in the production of the various 
sectors. Dirtiness of sectors is not the only important determinant of the negative impact 
of a stricter environmental regime as is believed. For production in industries that are 
equally dirty, one that uses the mobile input more intensely will show the impact more 
strongly. This theoretical result is tested using US abatement expenditure and production 
data. The coefficient on this factor-intensity dependent pollution haven term is 
significant. This makes the total effect of a stricter environmental regime on dirty 
industries much larger than what is seen using only the traditional dirtiness indicator of 
                                                 
22
 The capital expenditure data are not very indicative of year specific inducements and abatement capital 
is often difficult to separate from production capital. For more detail refer to Levinson and Taylor 2004. 
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industries. 
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 APPENDIX 1A: COPELAND AND TAYLOR’S TECHNIQUE OF COMBINING 
PRODUCTION OF OUTPUT AND PRODUCTION OF EMISSIONS INTO A COBB-
DOUGLAS FORM 
 
In the absence of any abatement activity Y=Ks, Z= K 
If θ is the fraction of resources spent for abatement activity, then the abatement 
technology is represented by the function (1-θ)1/α 
α<1 implies increasing returns to scale abatement technology. 
Output level with abatement activity: Y={(1- θ)K}s 
Emission level after abatement activity: Z=(1-θ)1/αK 
Elimination of θ between the above two production functions results in the Cobb Douglas 
form of production relation. Y=Z α s Ks- α s 
Note that for θ=0, Z=K>Y 
 
APPENDIX 1B: METHOD OF LINEARIZATION AND GETTING ON TO THE 
SADDLE PATH 
 
The two variable two equation system demonstrates the technique used for the actual 7X7 
system. 
The system of difference equations is written in the following format. 
A* Kt+1  = D* Kt 
Ct+1   Ct 
The variables Ct and Kt may either be in levels or in deviations from mean format 
(obtained by Taylor approximation for a non-linear system). 
Or  Kt+1  = A-1D* Kt 
Ct+1    Ct 
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The eigenvalues r1 and r2 for the system may be found as: 
Det |A-1D – r I |=0 
In case of a system with saddle path stability, one of the roots (say r1) will be greater than 
one and the other (r2) less than one. 
The eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues are found as: 
(A-1D – r I) *  m = 0 
  n 
Let (m1 n1)T be the eigenvector corresponding to the root r1 and (m2 n2) T be the 
eigenvector corresponding to r2.  (It is known, and has been verified, that mi=sini where si 
can be determined as a function of the elements of the matrix A-1D and the particular 
eigenvalue ri) 
The solution of a difference equation system of the above form is then given by: 
Kt = m1r1t+m2r2t 
Ct  n1r1t+n2r2t 
 
For the system not to explode, m1 and n1 have to have zero coefficients.Then given that s2 
and r2 are known from previous calculations, use of the initial conditions provides the 
value of n2 
K0= m2r2 = s2n2r2; C0=n2r2 
 
As a side-note, one can see the relation of the dynamics of the saddle path as a function 
of the stable eigenvalue: 
Kt= m2r2t 
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Kt+1= m2r2t+1 
Or Kt+1/Kt= r2 
Identical reasoning holds for Ct. 
 
APPENDIX 1C: CAPITAL OWNED, CAPITAL EMPLOYED, BONDS, AND 
EARNINGS FROM ABROAD 
 
For ease of understanding, let us consider a country that invests a part of its 
domestically owned capital abroad. (Since labor is assumed to be immobile, and since X 
commodity is produced only using labor, we need to worry only about capital and the 
production of Y) 
)()()()(
~~~~~~
1
~~~~
1
~~
tttttXttttttttt KKtopaymentBrXPKYBBKKCP −+++=−+−+ ++  
tK  is the amount that is employed in the country 
and tK
~~
 is the amount of capital owned by the economy, with 
~~
tK > tK  
tB
~~
 is the amount of bonds held for the purpose of consumption smoothing. 
 
In the first period when the economies open up to trade, we know exactly how 
much of the domestic capital locates abroad. In the subsequent periods there is no 
additional structural equation that determines the evolution of tK
~~
 in relation to the other 
variables of the system. tK
~~
 appears only in defining the budget equation. As we know 
and have seen above, bonds and capital get paid at the same rate rt. 
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What has happened is that the two variables: amount of capital employed abroad 
tt KK −
~~
 and amount of bonds held tB
~~
, are linearly dependant. 
Let us define a new variable )(
~~~~
tttt KKBB −+= . The summation of the two 
variables does not pose a contradiction in any part of the model because the payments to 
both these variables and the pollution effects (which is none) of both these variables are 
identical in every period. 
The existing system of structural equations is then able to trace out the evolution 
of tK  and tB . One only has to be careful in interpreting tB  because it is different from 
the way bonds are usually defined: ie for consumption smoothing purposes. The tB  here 
represents flow of domestic wealth to foreign nations for purpose of consumption 
smoothing and investments in production both of which earns returns at the rate rt in the 
current period. 
 
APPENDIX 1D: MODEL WITH NON-SPECIFIC INPUTS 
When both capital and labor inputs may be used in both sectors, we have four additional 
variables that were not present before: the labor used in Y sector and the amount of capital used 
in X sector in the home country as well as the foreign country. In addition to the new Euler 
equation for capital stock in X sector, the system also has to ensure that the returns to each input 
is equalized across the two sectors. It is assumed that the inter-sectoral decision for labor can be 
made in the current period but the decision about capital stock is made in the previous period.  
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First order condition with respect to YtK 1+ : 
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First order condition with respect to XtK 1+ : 
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11
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+= t
tttt
r
CPCP
ρ  
As investors have the option either to invest in capital in X sector, capital in Y sector or in bonds, 
the returns across these options must be equalized every period. 
)(')(')(')(' 1111111111 XtttXtXtYtttYtt KZCPKXPKZCPKYr ++++++++++ −=−= γγ  
or, )1()(')1)(('
t
ttXt
X
t
t
tt
Y
tt CPPKXCPKYr τ
βγ
τ
αγ −=−=  
Under the optimal pollution tax ttt CPγτ = , the above relation reduces to 
)(')1()(')1( XtXtYtt KXPKYr βα −=−=    
For labor market growth of labor is not a choice variable in this model. Thus for labor 
market to be in equilibrium it is sufficient that the value of marginal returns on labor is equalized 
across the two sectors every period. This equalization however occurs under the influence of 
pollution taxes in place, which ensures that optimal emissions calculations already affect the 
production function and the marginal product of labor. 
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Substitution of the market clearing condition  Yt
X
t LLL −=  into the intertemporal 
welfare function and consideration of the first order condition with respect to labor employed in 
any one of the sectors, provides the following equation.  
X
t
X
t
X
t
X
t
ttX
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X
t
X
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t
Y
t
Y
t
Y
t
ttY
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t
Y
tt
L
LKZCP
L
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L
LKZCP
L
LKY
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂ ),(),(),(),( γγ  
With efficient pollution tax, the above equation reduces to: 
)(')1()(')1( XtXtYtt LXPLYw βα −=−=  
In the absence of any abatement activity Y=(Kµ L1-µ) s ,Z= Kµ L1-µ 
Output level with abatement activity: Y={(1- θ) (Kµ L1-µ)}s 
Emission level after abatement activity: Z=(1-θ)1/α(Kµ L1-µ) 
Elimination of θ between the above two production functions results in the Cobb Douglas form of 
production relation. Y=Z α s Ks- α s 
The labor market and capital market equilibrium conditions can be combined to provide a 
relation between capital-labor ratios in the two sectors. 
)(')1(
)(')1(
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)(')1(
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Y
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X
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Y
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Y
t
L
Kf
L
K
KX
LX
KY
LY
=→=  under Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 
Numerical Simulation: 
Under constant returns to scale 
11 −=
ρ
r          (13) 
Equations (8) and (10) reveal that in the integrated economy, the growth of consumption 
expenditure is identical in the two countries. Thus, 
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*
0
0
* Wealth
Wealth
CP
CP
=         (14) 
0Wealth , 
*
0Wealth  are the value of the endowments of the home and foreign economy at the 
beginning of trade, valued at the international market prices. 
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Dividing 17 by 18: 
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BrXPYCP X ++=           (19) 
BrXPYCP X −+= ***         (20)
 
*][)]*,(*),([ CPCPLPXLPXPX +=+ ω
      (21) 
)*)(1()*(*)( CPCPKYKY +−=+ ω
      (22) 
While solving equation (13) - (20) for the steady state values, equations (14), (15), (16), 
(15X), (16X), (17), (18), (21), (22) form a self contained system 
for XXXYYXX PLLKKKKCPCP ,,,,,,,,*
***
. Once these values are solved, (13), (19) and (20) 
provide the solutions for BrP, . 
 
Actual solution process: 
1) Create a grid of Ly from 0 to 1, Ky 1 to very large number. 
First four equations create grid for PC, PC*, Ky*, Ly* 
2) For each element, calculate PC using equation 15. 
Y
sy
YY
K
LK
PC
µµ
α
α
µ
γ
α
α
ρ
−
−
−=−
1))(1(11       (15) 
3) Calculate PC* grid using equation 14. 
*
0
0
* Wealth
Wealth
CP
CP
=          (14) 
4) Calculate the demand for Y, and the amount produced by home to get the grid of market 
clearing supply of Y from foreign country. 
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5) Use equation (22’) and (16) to solve for Ky* and Ly* grid 
)*)(1()
**
()( **11 CPCPLK
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−
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−=−       (16) 
(22’) divided by (16) provides Ky. Put that back into either (22’) to solve for Ly*. 
Next 3 equations create grid for Kx, Kx* and Px*. However, Px* is left for later. 
6) Calculate aggregate demand for X. 
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Use (15X’) and (16X’) to rewrite equation (21) 
*][)()1(
11
* CPCPKK XX +=+
−
−
ω
ηβ
ρ
      (21’) 
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7) Also the already created grid of Ly and Ly* provides Lx and Lx* grid. So dividing equation 
(15X) by (16X) provides: 
ηβ
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=
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X
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K )()**()(
*
11
*
       (1516) 
Equation (21) provided sum of Kx, Kx* and equation (1516) provides ratio of these two. Hence 
the grid of Kx, Kx* is determined. 
Next two equations are used to choose a single combination out of the grid. 
Equation 17 says that wage in the two sectors for home country must be same. This equation is 
divided by the returns to capital in the two sectors of home country equations 15 and 15X. 
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Similarly equation (18) in conjunction with previously used equations provides (18’) 
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Next the remaining variables: Px and B are solved. 
Px : equation 21, 15X or 16X 
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r: equation 13: 11 −=
ρ
r          
B: Equation 19 or 20:  BrXPYCP X ++=      
BrXPYCP X −+= ***
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1E: SENSITIVITY OF RESULTS TO POLLUTION DISUTILITY 
PARAMETER 
 
Capital accumulates as the difference between production and consumption in 
both the standard growth models as well as in the current one with pollution disutility. 
This is captured in equation (1). The corresponding zero investment locus is given by 
equation (2). 
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The consumption growth equation in the standard growth model is given by 
equation (3). Equation (4) is the corresponding zero consumption expenditure growth 
equation. This expression embodies the fact that consumption expenditure attains a 
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steady level when the welfare cost of delaying the consumption by one period 
11 −
ρ
 
equals the payoff MPK of doing so.  
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With pollution disutility there is an additional term to the above equations. This 
appears because though the welfare cost of delaying consumption by one period is 
unchanged, the payoff from investment has changed. The reward for investing is the 
additional production (MPK) minus the disutility of pollution that is generated by using 
the unit of resource for future production instead of current consumption.  This is 
reflected in equation (5) while the associated zero consumption-expenditure growth locus 
is represented by equation (6). 
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Equation (1) is a positively sloped line in the consumption expenditure – capital 
plane as shown in Diagram 1.  A higher abatement tax makes capital less productive.  
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Hence for any steady state level of capital stock, a lower value of consumption 
expenditure can be sustained as shown by a leftward shift of the curve.  
The zero consumption-expenditure growth locus for the standard growth model is 
given by a horizontal locus in the consumption expenditure – capital plane. A higher 
abatement tax lowers the marginal productivity of capital and hence lowers the level of 
capital at which consumption expenditure remains steady. This is also represented in 
Diagram A1. 
Diagram A1: Steady state consumption locus under different emission tax 
 
When pollution disutility is an additional cost of productive capital, the level of 
capital at which consumption expenditure remains steady is a decreasing function of 
consumption expenditure. This happens because at higher consumption levels, pollution 
disutility is valued more strongly, making a lower capital stock desirable. This can be 
seen by comparing the solid lines in Diagram A2.  
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   Diagram A2: Steady state consumption locus under different disutility parameters 
 
A higher pollution tax has the previous dampening effect on the desired capital 
stock arising due to lowered productivity reasons. But the higher tax also lowers the 
pollution disutility and this difference is valued more strongly with higher consumption 
levels. This causes the gap between the desired capital stock in the high-tax low-tax 
scenarios to narrow at increasingly higher income. This is seen in Diagram 2.  
For sufficiently high pollution disutility sensitivity (high γ), the loci for different 
pollution tax regimes might even intersect indicating that the decreased attractiveness of 
capital due lower productivity is more than offset by the increased attractiveness due to 
the cleaner technology used. This is depicted in Diagram 3.  
  
  133 
 
   Diagram A3: Intersecting steady state consumption locus under different disutility  
                         parameters 
 
The steady state of the system is at the intersection of the zero capital growth and 
zero consumption-expenditure growth loci. To predict the effect of higher pollution taxes 
on the steady state, one has to note that for the ∆K=0 locus higher tax rates has positive 
effect on steady state capital and a negative effect on the expenditure level. For the 
∆PC=0 locus, higher tax rate has a negative impact on both steady capital and 
consumption expenditure levels. This is depicted in Diagram 4. The movement of the 
steady state solution depends on the direction of these two shifts. While the effect on the 
consumption expenditure is unambiguously negative, the outcome for capital depends on 
the relative strength of the two shifts.  
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   Diagram A4: Steady states equilibria under different disutility parameter values 
 
The steady state capital stock might increase even without the intersection of 
same γ differential tax ∆PC=0 loci. This is depicted in Diagram A5. For increased γ, the 
∆PC=0 loci shift down. However the distance between pairs of same γ different tax loci 
decreases as the clean technology associated with the higher tax is valued more with 
larger γ. Comparison of pairs of steady state (A,A’), (B,B’), (C,C’), (D,D’) show that 
though in the standard growth models with γ =0, the steady state capital is low for a high 
pollution tax, this might be reversed as γ increases. This may happen even when the γ is 
not large enough for the same γ different tax ∆PC=0 loci to intersect. 
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Diagram A5: Possibilities of steady states for different pollution disutility parameters
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APPENDIX 1F: TWO TRADING ECONOMIES THAT ARE IDENTICAL IN ALL 
RESPECTS, EXCEPT IN RELATIVE VALUATION OF POLLUTION 
 
From the perspective of the home country, the situation is almost similar to the 
one where the foreign economy was willing to accept international capital because it was 
poor. The home economy is not concerned  whether the trade partner is willing to take in 
the dirty capital because it is poor, or because the partner cares less about domestic 
pollution.  
 
Diagram A6: Income-emission relation for a more aware economy 
When we compare the foreign economy, the outcome is somewhat different than 
before. For one, it is has an equal share in all the productive resources wherever they may 
have been employed. This makes the final income of the foreign country to equal that of 
the home country. 
Also as this foreign country is less concerned about domestic environmental 
conditions, it is willing to accept large volumes of capital, thus providing a much looser 
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restrain on the growth of incomes of the world economy. For this reason, both countries 
end up at a higher income than possible otherwise. 
            
Diagram A7: Income-emission relation for a less aware economy 
 
It is often the case that the poorer economies are also the ones that care less about 
environmental regulations, perhaps in the hope of encouraging domestic growth. So a 
combination of if we are to combine the last two scenarios, it would emerge that the 
richer and more aware home will experience a better environmental condition and higher 
income. The poorer and less environmentally responsible foreign economy will 
experience a worse environmental condition and will be able to increase its income 
compared to enforcing strict environmental policies. However, in this model, income in 
the foreign economy does not catch up with that of the home as in a perfectly integrated 
model. The home always shares the increased productivity of the environmentally less-
strict foreign economy. 
 
  
  138 
APPENDIX 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TARIFFS AND PRICES 
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If w=W, ie if the weight that producers get relative to consumers is same in both 
economies, then the above term can be simplified. 
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For w>2/3, domestic prices of exports are rising in foreign tariffs 
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The above expression can be simplified when w=W 
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For w>2/3, domestic prices of imports are rising in domestic tariffs.
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APPENDIX 3: CHANGE IN INCOME DUE TO CHANGE IN INPUT PRICES 
Looking at the terms within parentheses: 
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It is useful to look at the effect of abatement that is only labor using or only capital using. 
If abatement uses both inputs, then the effect will be a combination of the two effects. 
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The coefficients simplify to zero, implying the change in input prices have no net effect 
on income 
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Each coefficient simplifies to zero, implying the change in input prices have no net effect 
on income 
Change in income due to change in effective endowment is seen in the following 
calculations. 
Term inside parenthesis: 
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If abatement if only capital using or only labor using, both should reduce income. So 
each term should be accompanied by a negative coefficient.  
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Reduction in effective endowment has a negative effect on aggregate income as shown 
by the negative coefficients 
